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Abstract
In recent years, we have been observing an increase in knowledge-intensive activities from emerg-
ing market latecomer companies in established centers of state-of-the-art knowledge. This new
direction of research and development (R&D) internationalization is still an under-researched
strategy for latecomers to gain competitive advantage. In order to uncover these mechanisms,
this dissertation uses the case of a Chinese latecomer that recently achieved a leading position in
the global telecommunications market: Huawei Technologies. The focus of this dissertation is
on the mechanisms that enabled the company to obtain strategic assets through R&D interna-
tionalization into leading markets. In a mixed-methods approach, quantitative patent data and
qualitative interviews are combined to trace the company’s development during its emancipation
from a latecomer stage to an industry leader. The results show that Huawei does its most inﬂuen-
tial R&D at its oﬀshore locations despite the risks and challenges of having core assets abroad. By
doing so, the company focuses on greenﬁeld investments instead of acquisitions by hiring experts
at oﬀshore locations. This way, Huawei leverages the experts’ embeddedness in the networks of
the global telecommunications industry, which helps the company to overcome liabilities of out-
sidership as well as challenges of legitimacy and become part of the global industry community.
Since the company has caught up on technological and organizational knowledge, it now splits its
R&Dtasks between research in centers of state-of-the-art technologies anddevelopment inChina,
in order to transfer innovative ideas from abroad to its domestic locations. Thus, the company
gains output capability by bridging the lack of innovative capability at its domestic R&D location
by employing experienced and creative experts at its oﬀshore locations.
Keywords: Chinese Latecomer, Research andDevelopment Internationalization, Innovation Ca-
pability, Greenﬁeld Investment, Mixed-Methods Approach, Patentdata
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Zusammenfassung
In jüngster Zeit lässt sich in etablierten Wissenszentren eine Zunahmen wissensintensiver Ak-
tivitäten durch Unternehmen aus aufstrebendenMärkten beobachten. Diese neue Richtung der
Forschungs- undEntwicklungsinternationalisierung (FuEI) ist eine aktuell nochwenig erforschte
Strategie für Latecomer Unternehmen umWettbewerbsvorteile zu erlangen. Um die dahinter-
liegenden Mechanismen zu ergründen nutzt diese Studie den Fall eines chinesischen Latecomer
Unternehmens, das erst kürzlich eine Führungsposition in der globalen Telekommunikationsin-
dustrie eingenommen hat: Huawei Technologies. Der Fokus dieser Dissertation liegt auf den
Mechanismen, die helfen strategischeAssets durch FuEI in führendeMärkte zu erwerben. Durch
einenMixed-MethodsAnsatzder quantitativePatentdatenundqualitative Interviewskombiniert,
wird die Entwicklung des Unternehmens vom Latecomer zum Industrieführer nachverfolgt. Die
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Huawei seine einﬂussreichste FuE an seinen Auslandsstandorten durch-
führt, trotz der Risiken Kerngeschäftsbereiche imAusland zu unterhalten. Dabei liegt der Fokus
auf Greenﬁeld Investitionen anstelle von Akquisitionen, in dem gezielt ausländische Experten an
den Auslandsstandorten eingestellt werden. Huawei nutzt die Einbettung dieser Experten in das
Netzwerk der globalen Telekommunikationsindustrie um seine Außenseiterstellung und die Le-
gitimitätsprobleme seiner Auslandsaktivitäten zu überwinden und Teil der globalen Industrie zu
werden. Nachdem das Unternehmen seinen Rückstand an technischem und organisationalem
Wissen inzwischen aufgeholt hat, teilt es nun seineFuETätigkeiten zwischenForschung in etablierten
Wissenszentren und Entwicklung inChina auf, was denTransfer innovativer Ideen aus demAus-
land zudenHeimatstandortenbefördert. Demnach erwirbt dasUnternehmendie Fähigkeit inno-
vative Produkte zu produzieren, in dem es fehlende innovative Fähigkeiten imHeimatland durch
das Nutzen der Erfahrung und Kreativität ausländischer Experten überbrückt.
Schlagworte: Chinesische Latecomer, Forschungs- und Entwicklungsinternationalisierung, In-
novationsfähigkeit, Greenﬁeld Investitionen, Mixed-Methods Ansatz, Patentdaten
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Preface
The most steady experiences I had during my research on "Huawei" was the continuous struggle
of people trying to pronounce the company’s name. The question of how to pronounce it still
causes confusion, even among German radio news reporters who I usually turn to for pronounc-
ing unfamiliar words. But other than that, a lot has changed since I started working on the topic
six years ago.
At the time I started working on this dissertation, Huawei Technologies was not a companymany
people had heard of. When I started to go to conferences and talk to other researchers about
my project, few had heard of the Chinese telecommunications giant before. This was particu-
larly true formyUS-American colleagues, who even asHuawei was becoming a popular brand for
smartphones in Europe, would not believe that this Chinese company might be seriously chas-
ing after Apple’s technological leadership. Nevertheless, Huawei recently achieved popularity for
its infrastructure business from the headlines about its struggles with the US government rather
than for its ground-breaking 5G technology. The observations Imade for this dissertation in 2017
would be diﬃcult to make today after Huawei has become such a heated topic, as the recent po-
litical struggles might have overshadowed the insights aboutHuawei’s unique path as a latecomer
gained from the interviews. Nevertheless, the recent headwind Huawei received shows that even
despite being able to catch-up in the industry, sensitive markets such as communication infras-
tructure are not won by technological competence alone as they are also subject to political risk.
To come back to the main question you all have probably been eager to get answered, the sug-
gested English pronunciation for "Huawei" is "Wah-Way", as the company explains in an oﬃcial
YouTube video. Even if Chinese-speakers emphasize the missing silent H in this version, it is also
the version used by the international employees I spoke with. I therefore decided to stick with it.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In our knowledge-based economy reliant on growth and technological progress, the gradient in
innovation capability between regions is heavily contributing to the unequal distribution of eco-
nomic wealth and welfare (Romer, 1990). Leading global players usually come from regions with
ample access to innovation capabilities, but we recently observe that companies from formerly
more economically peripheral regions, who are lacking innovation capability in their home region,
strive to become competitive towards established global players in knowledge-intensive industries
(Buckley & Hashai, 2014; Chen et al., 2012; Hsu et al., 2015). An indicator for this development
is the growing presence of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from emerging markets
directed at accessing knowledge and innovation capability in established markets (Gammeltoft,
2008; Poon et al., 2006; Mathews, 2002). The recentWorld Bank Report on Global Investment
Competitiveness shows an immense growth of OFDI from emerging markets, a trend heavily
driven by China, which made up more than a third of all emerging markets’ OFDI stock in 2015
(Perea & Stephenson, 2019). If emerging-market multinational enterprises (EMNEs) are able to
leverage these investments made through the internationalization of their research and develop-
ment (R&D) activities, they might be able to build innovation capability themselves in the long
run. This is important as it might change the high percentage of low value-added tasks of jobs
in emerging regions towards more knowledge-intensive and higher value-added tasks (Mudambi,
2008; Gereﬃ & Lee, 2012), thus increasing economic wealth and welfare in the EMNE’s home
regions.
Despite the growing presence of EMNEs on the global stage, we still know too little about how
1
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actual upgrading through R&D internationalization works (Awate et al., 2015). This is particu-
larly the question for latecomers amongEMNEs, enteringmature industries, because they have to
catch up to already established players and enter markets that are already being served (Mathews,
2002; Luo & Tung, 2007, 2018). This dissertation therefore sheds light on the under-researched
mechanisms of latecomers gaining competitiveness throughR&D internationalization. It does so
by studying the case of a latecomer from China that recently became a technological and market
leader in telecommunications: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (Huawei).
1.2 Theory and Research Gaps
Iammarino &McCann (2013) emphasizes that the origin of most global R&D has long been ma-
jorly established countries such as the triad of theUS, EU and Japan. The now increasing partici-
pation of EMNEs in globalR&D is one of themain drivers for the changing economic geography
of the world. Locating in centers of state-of-the-art knowledge is highly important for high value
activities, and emerging regions without access to knowledge assets are at risk of being left be-
hind with low value-added activities (Iammarino & McCann, 2013). The global split of tasks in
multinational enterprises (MNE) increasingly follows the value chain stage of the activity to the
most eﬀective host location (Crescenzi et al., 2014). This bears risks but also chances for EMNEs
and their home regions, as it aﬀects regional connectivity and dependencies between regions on
a global level (Crescenzi & Iammarino, 2017). MNEs are inﬂuencing regional development by
orchestrating knowledge ﬂows across space and are an important source for technology transfer
between regions, in particular in cases in which regions have diﬀerent levels of innovation capabil-
ities.
Among thediscussionson internationalizationofEMNEs, the activities ofChineseMNEsabroad
have received special attention in the literature. Previous work on this topic includes the study
of OFDI from China (Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Si & Liefner, 2014; Si et al., 2013; Buckley et al.,
2018, 2007; Luo et al., 2010; Child & Rodriguez, 2005; Luo & Lemanski, 2016; Deng, 2013; Di
Minin et al., 2012) and in particular the understanding of Chinese OFDI done by mergers and
2
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acquisitions (Rui & Yip, 2008; Richter-Tokar, 2019; Haasis & Liefner, 2019; Haasis et al., 2018;
Amendolagine et al., 2018). Based on the literature’s growing interest in the topic, Ramamurti &
Hillemann (2018) study which features make Chinese MNE a special case. They conclude that
government-created advantages and the very big home-market are the key features that distigu-
ishes Chinese MNEs from most other EMNEs. The dynamically growing consumer market in
China has attracted incoming foreign direct investment (IFDI), which some scholars argue jump-
started the upgrading process of Chinese companies by exposing them to state-of-the-art technol-
ogy and increasing the pressure on them in their homemarket (Hsu et al., 2015). This mechanism
is also discussed in theories of latecomer catch-up (Mathews, 2002; Luo & Tung, 2018).
The terminology used in studies on EMNEs’ R&D internationalization indicates that this is a
rather new phenomenon. For instance, the term reverse knowledge transfer for transfer from
oﬀshore subsidiaries to the headquarters, instead of the more common direction from the head-
quarters to the subsidiary, shows that the prevalent perspective is the perspective of established
MNEs and their headquarters (Ambos et al., 2006; Liu & Meyer, 2018; Awate et al., 2015). An-
other example is the use of the term oﬀshoring in this dissertation. The term is usually used for
established MNEs oﬀshoring labor-intensive tasks to low-income regions to beneﬁt from lower
costs of local employees. In this dissertation, the term is used for an EMNE internationalizing
R&D activities into global centers of knowledge in order to beneﬁt from higher innovativeness of
local employees. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing debate among scholars whether there is a need
for new theories for EMNEs, or if the theories developed for establishedMNEs already cover the
recently observed developments (Hernandez &Guillén, 2018).
Continuing on terminology, the terms EMNE and latecomer used here have similar but not equal
meanings. Mathews (2002) describes a latecomer as a company from an emerging market enter-
ing an already established industry, which bears particular advantages such as lower production
costs and higher ﬂexibility compared to incumbents. On the ﬂipside, the disadvantages are lack
of technological expertise and outsidership from the market. The strategic focus of latecomers
is on catching up to incumbents. In contrast, EMNEs are not necessarily latecomers, for exam-
ple if they are operating in an industry that is young and not yet established. Which term is used
depends onwhether the context is the catch-up process or the origin and organization of the com-
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pany.
The core theoretical frameworks explaining the catch-up of latecomer ﬁrms are the linking, lever-
age and learning of theLLL-framework (Mathews, 2002) and the springboard-perspective (Luo&
Tung, 2007, 2018). On the one hand, these approaches are based on themore static resource-based
view (RBV) of the ﬁrm (Barney, 1991;Wernerfelt, 1984; Penrose, 1959) that explains the compet-
itiveness of a ﬁrm from its resources, in particular knowledge. On the other hand, they are based
on the RBV’s more ﬂexible extension which is the dynamic capabilities argument (Teece et al.,
1997; Teece, 2007), which explains how ﬁrms can maintain competitive advantage in dynamically
changing environments by being able to renew their competences. It puts particular emphasis on
the importance of management structures and organizational learning.
The LLL-framework explains how latecomers in high-tech industries can upgrade their knowl-
edge base and production by absorbing knowledge from technologically advanced business part-
ners (Mathews, 2002). The three steps described in the framework are linking with advanced
partners, actively leveraging the cooperation for knowledge spill-over eﬀects and learning by in-
tegrating the knowledge through repeated application of the steps ahead. This creates dynamic
capabilities for the latecomerﬁrm. However, this framework ismore focused on learning anddoes
not explain how latecomers might be able to build innovation capabilities in the process. More-
over, it is less focused on the process of internationalizing for the purpose of catch-up.
The springboard-perspective explains how EMNEs use their internationalization to acquire re-
sources abroad and avoid home market constraints to catch up with incumbents (Luo & Tung,
2007). The theory describes how EMNEs take higher risks and are less prone to follow the more
cautious internationalization paths observed for establishedMNEs. Moreover, one of their main
aims is tight integrationof outward anddomestic activities. Their investments abroad are directed
at advanced technology and production as well as brands for which they use in most cases acquisi-
tions. Many springboard-companies have already gained some international experience through
IFDI into their home countries, which is nevertheless not suﬃcient for catch-up as it does not
help to overcome liabilities of foreignness for selling products in establishedmarket (Luo&Tung,
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2007). Similar to the LLL-framework, Luo&Tung (2007) explain that the springboard-processes
are recurrent. This point is emphasized in a recent extension of the theory in which the upward
spiral concept is introduced. The concept describes how ﬁrst inward internationalization, second
OFDI, third transferring resources back to the home market and ﬁnally capability upgrading in
the home market boost the latecomers capabilities (Luo & Tung, 2018). Even if this theory gives
us a better understanding of the processes, it is very much focused on acquisitions as an entry
mode compared to other forms of internationalization such as greenﬁeld investments, which the
authors themselves acknowledge (Luo & Tung, 2018). Moreover, it does not attend to the micro-
level processes of the catch-up process and the arising inter-dependencies between the aﬀected
locations connected through the latecomer MNE, which still lack evidence and need to be stud-
ied more.
The ﬁeld of latecomers catching up on innovative capability still raises many questions. The fol-
lowing section summarizes the most pressing questions identiﬁed in recent literature reviews to
motivate the broader research questions for this dissertation. Hernandez & Guillén (2018) state
that the fundamental issue scholars should be studying about EMNEs is how they develop glob-
ally valuable capabilities in the ﬁrst place by studying their emerging phase. Those ﬁndings might
be applicable not just to EMNEs but also to the early stages of now establishedMNEs. Papanas-
tassiou et al. (2019) identify three key concepts that researchers should study more closely in the
future to better understand R&D internationalization and innovation: cross-border knowledge-
sourcing strategies, the change in the geography of R&D and innovativeness, and international
fragmentation of R&D activities. In a similar vein, Iammarino &McCann (2013) claim that the
geography ofMNE innovation has been largely under-studied. Awate et al. (2015) point out that
even among the recently emerging literature on EMNEs, little attention has been paid to under-
standing EMNEs’R&D internationalization. Asakawa et al. (2018) claim that we needmore stud-
ies onMNEs that focus on subsidiary knowledge sourcing abroad.
In summary, we still do not know exactly how latecomer companies become globally competitive,
and there is lacking evidence from the micro- or individual-level as to the mechanisms enabling
this development. Moreover, the reasoning that EMNEs internationalize their R&D into cen-
ters of state-of-the-art knowledge in order to access knowledge and markets needs more in-depth
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investigation. This dissertation investigates these research gaps by looking deeper into the micro-
mechanisms of R&D internationalization and analyzing its spatial pattern for understanding the
upgradingmechanisms of innovative activities in the latecomer context. In order to gain in-depth
insights into those mechanisms, I am using Huawei as a case study because it is a recent example
of an EMNE and latecomer that has focused on R&D internationalization through greenﬁeld
investments, an understudied entry mode. The main questions leading the investigations are the
following:
• How can latecomers use R&D internationalization for catching up in established indus-
tries?
• How can latecomers build innovation capabilities through R&D internationalization?
• What are the mechanisms of catching up through R&D internationalization by greenﬁeld
investments?
• How can EMNEs orchestrate innovative R&D activity in multiple locations?
These questions are the underlying research interest addressed in three consecutive articles that
build the main part of this dissertation. Each article has its own, more narrow research questions,
that taken together answer the broader questions. This study contributes to the literature by un-
folding strategies of a latecomer setting up and operating global R&D networks to gain interna-
tional competitiveness.
1.3 Economic Geography and International Business
This dissertation is placed at the intersection between the disciplines of Economic Geography
(EG) and International Business (IB), two disciplines that have long evolved in parallel and only
in the recent decade started to deliberately draw from each others’ perspective. EconomicGeogra-
phers have traditionally been borrowing theoretical concepts frommanagement and IB as they do
from other disciplines such as economics or social science. What is new is the rise of reciprocated
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interest of other disciplines in traditional research ﬁelds of Economic Geographers (Liefner &
Schätzl, 2017). The particular interest of IB scholars has sparked a bilateral dialog of both disci-
plines and the deliberate claim to contribute to and learn from one another.
The recent surge of special issues in Journal of EconomicGeography and Journal of International
Business Studies on bringing the two disciplines together are indicators for rising mutual inter-
est. Moreover, discussion forums and conferences such as the annual conference on International
Business, Economic Geography and Innovation (iBEGIN) or special sessions at conferences, a
recent example being a panel discussion at the Academy of International Business (AIB) Annual
Meeting 2019 about "Economic Geography and International Business: Building Bridges", show
an increasing interest of scholars fromboth disciplines to interact. Jones (2018) argues inProgress
in Human Geography that this recent trend might be driven by a shift towards spatial thinking in
IB andmanagement studies fromwhich both sides beneﬁt. For instance, a recent attempt to delib-
erately integrate RBV and dynamic capabilities with EG’s buzz and pipelines comes from Fitjar
et al. (2013) in their study on the eﬀect of manager attitudes and ﬁrm capabilities on innovation.
Jones (2018) argues that Economic Geographers have been using the ﬁrm-level for analysis from
a geographical perspective ever since the 1990s, and have long been going beyond the study of
regional competitive advantage and spatial decision-making in ﬁrms. Moreover, EconomicGeog-
raphers do not necessarily take the location as unit of analysis but views phenomena from a spatial
perspective which means including concepts of space, interrelation and distance in their take on
research issues.
A particularly insightful object to study in both disciplines are MNEs as a major force for shap-
ing the geography of the world economy (Iammarino & McCann, 2013). Understanding their
behavior and the processes triggered by it is crucial to understand the mechanisms that shape the
geography of today’s interconnected economy. Changes in MNEs’ strategies quickly translate
into changes in the geography of economic wealth and welfare. Therefore, regional economic
growth today can be heavily inﬂuenced by MNEs connecting the regional with the global level.
One of the arguments ElisaGiuliani made at the AIB panel is that even if EconomicGeographers
are often interested in large-scale and aggregated phenomena, they should take into account the
mechanisms happening at the ﬁrm level. In a similar vein, Beugelsdijk et al. (2010) claim that for
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a long time a shortcoming of EG used to be ignoring the complex spatial behavior of MNEs.
Combining both perspectives can better explain the recent shift we see in the geography of partic-
ipants in knowledge-intensive industries and brings together the tools needed to understand the
emerging knowledge economy (Mudambi et al., 2018). Further, it allows us to understand inno-
vation as an outcome of the interaction between industry dynamics and locations of knowledge
creation (Cohendet et al., 2018). For example, MNEs’ location decision on R&D activities inﬂu-
ences the distribution of knowledge and reinforces existing location (dis)advantages. However,
Bathelt et al. (2018) suggest that we need to take into account that the concept of knowledge dif-
fers between the two disciplines. While knowledge is rather seen as a private good in IB, as it is
the foundation of competitive advantage for many ﬁrms, it is mostly seen as a public good in EG,
as it is created and shared in and between locations of knowledge. Nevertheless, the globalization
of capability building and creative processes inﬂuences both the company and regional level and
their interconnectedness needs to be taken into account when researching this phenomenon. The
competitive advantage of companies and regions is aﬀected by increasingly international capabil-
ity building and knowledge creation. This dissertation draws from both disciplines by observing
ﬁrm-level micro-processes that help to better understand spatial dependency and current dynam-
ics in the division of market shares between established and emergingMNEs.
1.4 The case study
In this dissertation, the case study company Huawei is embedded in the highly dynamic environ-
ment of the telecommunications industry. This industry relies heavily on constant innovations as
technology life cycles are rather short and game-changing and inventions quickly exhibit global
impact. Therefore, it is crucial for incumbents in this ﬁeld to keep up with the global state-of-
the-art to maintain their position in this highly dynamic environment. So-called catch-up cycles
can oﬀer latecomers the chance to enter mature industries. These are cycles of regularly recurring
windows of opportunity opening in cooling down phases of the industry when incumbents need
to size down because of ﬁnancial pressure (Lee &Malerba, 2017). This makes the innovation and
8
Chapter 1
learning strategies in this fast-paced industry an insightful object to study the catch-up of late-
comers.
The case study ofHuawei is particularly valuable because it is one of the fewEMNEs that recently
became a global technological leader. I mainly focus on the period between 2004 and 2016, when
Huawei was rapidly expanding its global R&D activities and was about to leave its follower posi-
tion to become competitive towards established players. In this, I follow Hernandez & Guillén
(2018) who suggest that researchers should focus on EMNEs’ emerging phase. A distinct factor
for Huawei’s development was the condition of China’s domestic telecommunications market in
the late 1980s at the time the companywas founded. After the start ofChina’s open door policy in
1984, particularly rural regions had a huge demand for telecommunication infrastructure (Mu &
Lee, 2005). In the beginning, Huawei’s strategy was to build up technological capabilities by sell-
ing low-end equipment in rural regions to avoid competition from technologically advanced for-
eign competitors who focused their activities on larger cities (Li &Cheong, 2016; Lee et al., 2016).
This approach helpedHuawei to avoid direct competition from global players while growing and
building expertise. In a similar fashion, Huawei expanded its sales to other emergingmarkets ﬁrst
before taking on more established markets.
In contrast to its state-owned competitors, it was not until the mid-2000s that privately owned
Huawei received ﬁnancial incentives from the China Development Bank as part of the Chinese
GoingGlobal Policy. Around 2004,Huawei started to extend its R&D activities to global innova-
tion centers overseas. Its strategy for doing sowas remarkable because neither spatial, institutional
nor cultural distance seemed to play a role for the sequence of its R&D internationalization. For
instance, the company entered Silicon Valley as one of its ﬁrst oﬀshore locations (Fan, 2011).
Nevertheless, the political climate in Western markets was not favorable for Huawei: The US
government blocked its acquisition attempts multiple times and excluded the company from bid-
ding for national network projects, causingHuawei to focus sales on the European, Canadian and
Australianmarket (Nolan, 2014; Cooke, 2012; Chung&Mascitelli, 2015). In terms of technology,
as a late entrantHuaweiwas able to have someof its technology included into the standards for the
forth generation of cellular network technology (4G) and was amajor driver for the development
of the ﬁfth generation (5G). Nevertheless, Huawei has struggled with liabilities of foreignness
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and outsidership in theWest from the beginning and hadmajor diﬃculties to become integrated
into the global industry. Repeated espionage allegations from the US government damaged the
company’s global reputation. During the recent trade dispute with China, the US government
repeatedly voiced security concerns about using Huawei’s 5G infrastructure equipment and even
pressured third-party governments not to buy it. Nevertheless, the hostility against the company
is also reﬂective of the company’s dynamic growth and success on the global market and its grow-
ing inﬂuence seems to be seen as a threat by industrial and political stakeholders.
Despite the recent political struggles, the question remains how Huawei was able to develop the
capabilities thatmakes it a technological leader today. In order to give a ﬁrst overview ofHuawei’s
global R&D activities, ﬁgure 1.1 shows some of the most active oﬀshore locations and their inter-
nal connections to other R&D locations. The ﬁgure shows the largest oﬀshore locations in terms
of publication activity in blue and their connection through co-publication to Huawei’s Chinese
locations in red. The size of the nodes and edges represents the frequency of the co-publication
activity. This ﬁgure gives an overview of Huawei’s internal R&D cooperation. We can see that
Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzhen are connected to almost all of the oﬀshore locations. The
ﬁgure also shows that the connections are very much centered towards China with less connec-
tions between oﬀshore oﬃces. This is reﬂective of the strategic orchestration of the intra-ﬁrm
communication which is very much directed at transferring information towards China as much
as possible and controlling the activities of its oﬀshore locations closely.
1.5 Methods and Data
In order to answer the research question how latecomers can leverage R&D internationalization
to become globally competitive, I am using a case study (Yin, 2014) built upon a mixed-methods
design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). My approach of studying latecomer catch-up through
R&D internationalization is to use Huawei as an unusual case (Yin, 2014). The concrete concep-
tualization of the case study design changes according to the focus of the research question of
the respective article. In article one, Huawei is used as an unusual case in terms of its rapid de-
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Fig. 1.1: Co-publications of Huawei’s oﬀshore locations
velopment and successful catching-up. The case focuses on the company’s general R&D pattern
whereas in article two Huawei is regarded in the light of an unusual case because of its particular
mode of greenﬁeld R&D and the role of the oﬀshore experts hired in this unusual approach. For
article three, the case of Huawei is representative for a latecomer that recently became a techno-
logical leader through focusing on internal innovation.
The research design of the dissertation follows an embedded multiphase mixed-methods design
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Hurmerinta-Peltomäki & Nummela, 2006). Figure 1.2 shows the
sequence of the research phases and the kind of data used for each. It starts with a quantitative
approach in article one that is followed by a qualitative study for article two and amixed-methods
design for article three. The connection of how the studies build upon each other is indicated by
the dotted arrows on the right-hand side of the ﬁgure. Moreover, the embedded element of the
design relates to the data. The interview data is embedded in the patent data 1 as the interviewees
1Only one interviewee was identiﬁed by the bibliometric data alone. Nevertheless, the bibliometric information
was used to triangulate information from patent data and get a better overview of which oﬀshore locations were not
uncovered by using patent data, for instanceMoscow and Paris.
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are a sub-sample of the inventors on the patent documents. This ensures that the ﬁndings from
both can be integratedmore smoothly from a conceptual point of view because both data sources
provide access to the same object of study and allows for more solid ﬁndings.
Fig. 1.2: Data integration
A particularly important part of designing a reliable mixed-methods study is to think about the
integration of the methods. This needs to draw out how the study is not simply paralleling or
triangulating diﬀerentmethods but arrives at its ﬁndings through integrating themethods which
enables the researcher to answer questions that could not have been answered by using onemethod
alone (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Kuckartz, 2014). In this dissertation, there are two levels of
mixed-methods integration: One is the overall dissertation and the other is article three in which
the qualitative and quantitative analysis are integrated directly. This is also reﬂected in ﬁgure 1.2
by the solid black arrows indicating which data source was used for which article. For the overall
dissertation I use result-based integration of all ﬁndings in order to draw conclusions and answer
the research questions posed earlier (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).
In the following, I am going to give a detailed report of the data collection process and a gen-
eral overview of how the data was analyzed. A more detailed discussion of the data analysis can
be found in the respective chapters. The data ﬁrst collected for this dissertation was the patent
data. Patents are the footprints ofMNEs’ worldwide R&D activities that can help us understand
the global patterns of innovative activity. Even if this type of data cannot deliver the complete
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picture of a company’s R&D, it is a good proxy and has been widely used in the literature for
measuring R&D output (Hagedoorn &Cloodt, 2003; Frietsch et al., 2010; Trajtenberg, 1990). By
analyzing this data carefully, it is possible to outline the contours ofMNEs’ globalR&Dactivities.
The patent data sets were obtained from the PATSTAT database at the Fraunhofer-Institute for
Systems and Innovation Research (ISI) in Karlsruhe and the PatentsView website. PATSTAT
is operated by the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) but contains data from patent oﬃces world-
wide. PatentsView is maintained by the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO)
and provides US patent data only. The sources cover data from the former State Intellectual
Property Oﬃce in China (SIPO) 2, the USPTO, the EPO and theWorld Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO). Looking at data from multiple patent oﬃces enables a more diﬀerenti-
ated picture of global patent applications than the common approach of looking at USPTOdata
alone. Nevertheless, this can be a valid approach if the researchers know the object under study
well so they can identify what they might miss by omitting other perspectives. This needs to be
done sometimes because the data frommultiple oﬃces cannot be compared directly and needs to
be analyzed separately because of diﬀering legal regulations and procedures. Moreover, bibliomet-
ric data from Elsevier’s Scopus was added to create a more complete picture of Huawei’s global
research activities. Bibliometric data has the advantage that it can show a more comprehensive
picture of global research activity because it can be compared across countries more easily than
patent data. Nevertheless, it is often less comprehensive, does not necessarily indicate innovation
and provides less information than patent data, for instance on technology.
The patent data provides the names and the addresses of the inventors as well as the date of appli-
cation, the patent authority of the priority application, technology classes and citations. Because
the applicant of a patent is not necessarily the employer of the inventors on the patent (Ge et al.,
2016), I added employer information from LinkedIn, Researchgate and others social media plat-
forms to the patent data in order to verify which inventors actually worked for Huawei at the
time of the patent application and which worked for external ﬁrms or universities. The inventors’
addresses are then used to locateHuawei’sR&Dactivity, which is a commonly used proxy for loca-
2TheChinese State Intellectual PropertyOﬃce (SIPO) changed its name in 2018 toNational Intellectual Prop-
erty Administration (CNIPA)
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tion when analyzing patents ofMNEs (TerWal & Boschma, 2009). Using this information, I am
able to draw a nuanced picture of Huawei’s worldwide R&D activities in terms of location, qual-
ity, kind of technology and timing. Nevertheless, using patent data has some shortcomings that
need to be addressed. Patents do not cover all R&D activities of ﬁrms as some outcomes can not
be patented. Patents only signal technology that is new and commercializable. Moreover, Grupp
(1998) points out that the coverage of patent data depends on the sector under analysis. The ﬁeld
of telecommunications inwhichHuawei operates relies heavily on patentingwhichmakes patents
a good proxy for innovative activity there.
Overall, patent and publication data can only show us the broader patterns of Huawei’s R&D ac-
tivity over time but not the underlying mechanisms. Therefore, I attempt to ﬁll the blind spots
researchers usually have when working with patent data by using qualitative interviews. In order
to complement the picture and account for the methodological shortcomings of the patent data,
I conducted qualitative interviews with 40 experts Huawei hired at its eight largest oﬀshore loca-
tions by patenting in San Jose, SanDiego, Dallas, Chicago, Ottawa, Bridgewater, Stockholm and
Munich. Over 200 potential intervieweeswere identiﬁed by using the patent and publication data.
I conducted the interviews in person or via Skype and telephone either fromGermany or theUS.
The interviews were not audio-recorded for reasons of conﬁdentiality, but meticulous transcripts
were made during the interviews that were then typed and analyzed through the qualitative analy-
sis softwareMaxQDA. For ethical reasons, strict anonymity was ensured to the interview partners
and therefore the interviews were anonymised and personal information about the participants is
strongly restricted.
Moreover, a review of print media reports on Huawei was conducted to gain additional insights
into Huawei’s politically motivated hiring of former oﬃcials and lobbyists. Overall, 17 articles
were identiﬁed via searching Google News for the combination of "Huawei" with the key words
"lobby*", "board", "board member*", "hire/hiring", and "oﬃcial*". The material was then analyzed
through qualitative content analysis viaMaxQDA.This data was only used in the qualitative anal-
ysis of article two.
For studying R&D internationalization, the literature so far has mostly focused on the manage-
ment level of global ﬁrms in order to understand how they build capabilities and innovativeness.
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This study does not focus on management but looks at the tasks the individual technical experts
fulﬁll in order to get a bottom-up perspective on the catch-up processes within the company. Fol-
lowing Tokatli (2015), I avoid falling for the company narrative and talking points prepared by
management by taking the perspective of the oﬀshore experts. In particular at Huawei, the nar-
rative that the company’s success is mainly build upon the hardships and dedication of Chinese
engineers and its founder is very pronounced (deCremer &Tao, 2015; Luo et al., 2011). Moreover,
interviews with individual technical experts provide access to research on the micro-mechanisms
of catch-up and innovative activities more so than interviews with management. Further, the in-
terview approach provides insights into internal and external perspectives onHuawei because the
interviewees have been outsiders for most of their career and some are again at the time of the in-
terview. Thus, they are informed about the outsider’s perspective of the industry on the company
or even have taken this perspective themselves.
1.6 Overview
This cumulative dissertation ismade up of three articles which represent the following three chap-
ters. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the articles, their objectives and data sources 3 as well as their
current status as of October 15th 2019. The table also shows an additional article that is not part
of this dissertation, as work on it started in 2014 before the beginning of my dissertation. Nev-
ertheless, the article originates from the same line of work on Huawei and is part of the prior
knowledge that this dissertation is build upon. This article provides insights into Huawei’s col-
laboration with external research facilities at oﬀshore locations in Germany. It uses a patent data
set I developed for my master’s thesis to show Huawei’s collaboration patterns in Germany and
identify the interview partners for the main part of the paper. The article was published in Tech-
novation in April 2019.
All three dissertation papers are authored and conceptualized byme. The co-authors contributed
to selected passages and provided input through discussions. Their contributions are listed in the
3Parts of the theory, case study description and methodological sections of the framework and the articles natu-
rally overlap in content.
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following. The ﬁrst article is co-authored with Ingo Liefner who contributed in writing to the
case study description, to the conclusion and in discussing the choice of method. The article was
published in Scientometrics in September 2017. The second article is a single-authored paper that
is accepted as a research note in Journal of International Business Studies. The third article is co-
authored with Stefan Hennemann and Ingo Liefner. Stefan Hennemann contributed in writing
to the theory section, the description of the quantitative ﬁndings, the conclusion and in discussing
the quantitative model. Ingo Liefner contributed in writing to the theory section. The article has
the status major revision at Journal of Economic Geography.
Table 1.1: Overview of articles
Title and Authors Objective Data andMethod Journal
Oﬀshore versus domestic:
Can EMMNCs4 reach higher R&D
quality abroad?
Schaefer, Liefner
Global patterns of
Huawei’s R&D
quality
Generalized linear
models for patent
data
Scientometrics
(published)
Catching up by Hiring:
The Case of Huawei
Schaefer
The role of oﬀshore
R&D experts in the
catch-up process
Qualitative content
analysis of interview
data
Journal of
International
Business Studies
(accepted)
Give Us Ideas! -
Splitting research and development to
bridge lack of innovativeness
Schaefer, Hennemann, Liefner
Locations for
creation ideas and
their internal
transfer
Mixed-methods
approach for patent-
and interview data
Journal of
Economic
Geography
(major revision)
Additional paper (not part of dissertation)
A latecomer ﬁrm’s R&D collaboration with
advanced country universities and research
institutes: The case of Huawei in Germany
Liefner, Si, Schaefer
Technology
absorption from
German URI
Qualitative analysis
of patent and
interview data
Technovation
(published)
In order to give an overview of the articles, ﬁgure 1.3 shows the level of analysis and methodology
of the articles and the corresponding chapter number. Article one in chapter two gives an overview
of Huawei’s global R&D activities at the macro-level. It shows the global patterns and the impor-
tance of oﬀshore activity. The ﬁndings of this article show how important oﬀshore experts are
forHuawei and therefore build the foundation for the research questions of article two in chapter
three. Article two looks deeper into the role of the oﬀshore experts at the individual level, cover-
ing Huawei’s micro-level. While investigating the tasks of the oﬀshore experts it becomes clear
4Inconsistencies in abbreviations, such as EMNEs for emerging-marketmultinational enterprises or EMMNCs
for emerging-marketmultinational companies between the chapters result fromdiﬀerences in standard abbreviations
used by the journals.
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that Huawei splits its R&D between oﬀshore and domestic locations. This leads to the research
questions for article three in chapter four that are concerned with the interaction between the lo-
cations, therefore taking place at the meso-level of the ﬁrm. This article looks at how R&D tasks
at oﬀshore locations and at home are integrated within the company and what this tells us about
the innovative process in the company.
Fig. 1.3: Levels of case study analysis
In the following paragraphs, the motivation andmethodology of the articles are summarized. Ar-
ticle one lays the groundwork and establishes the spatial pattern of Huawei’s global R&D quality.
The study carefully examines the locations of Huawei’s core R&D along multiple dimensions of
R&D quality. The main question for the ﬁrst article is whether Huawei is able to conduct high-
quality R&D abroad despite facing high liabilities of foreignness and outsidership (Denk et al.,
2012; Zaheer, 1995; Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), as the ﬁndings in the literature so far have been
contradictory on the potential success or failure of oﬀshore R&D (Hsu et al., 2015; Cantwell
& Mudambi, 2005; Sofka, 2006). The aim is to examine whether taking the risks and costs of
conducting R&D abroad results in higher output quality and provide a better understanding of
Huawei’s global R&D strategy. Only if the company is able to overcome liabilities, it can perform
high quality R&D that produces high quality patents. This article also focuses onmethodological
questions about how to use patent data to identify the quality of patents at diﬀerent locations of
MNEs.
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In order to rule out home oﬃce bias, patent data from three diﬀerent patent oﬃces is analyzed
to unveil the diﬀerence between home-based and oﬀshore patent quality. Moreover, this study
considers three dimensions of R&D quality: forward citations for scientiﬁc impact, backward
citations for breadth of technical background as well as family size for geographic scope and eco-
nomic value (Carpenter et al., 1981; Harhoﬀ et al., 2003; Trajtenberg, 1990; Albert et al., 1991; van
Zeebroeck & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2011; Lanjouw & Schankermann, 2004; Fis-
cher & Leidinger, 2014). The data is analyzed using Poisson and negative binomial regression
methods to explain the patent quality indicators through the location of the inventors. We ﬁnd
that several quality dimensions show a higher value if experts at oﬀshore locations are involved.
As explained above, the research in chapter three and four builds upon those ﬁndings. Because
the study shows that Huawei’s core R&D is located abroad despite facing liabilities there, the
next step is to unveil the role of Huawei’s oﬀshore R&D in the company’s quest for competitive-
ness. AsHuawei is known to be one of the very fewChinese companies that focuses on greenﬁeld
investments in R&D internationalization, the focus is on the individual employees the company
hires abroad. Therefore, the role of employees hired at the company’smost important locations in
the US, Canada, Sweden and Germany is analyzed more in-depth through interviews with those
oﬀshore experts.
The second article looks at how hiring oﬀshore experts helps Huawei build competitive advan-
tage. It investigates greenﬁeldR&D internationalization as an alternative to the better researched
mechanisms of knowledge-seeking through acquisitions (Kumar et al., 2019; Luo & Tung, 2018;
Anderson et al., 2015). Hiring experts at centers of state-of-the-art technology might be a par-
ticularly promising mechanism for latecomers to surpass global competitors and has so far been
mainly discussed as amechanism to increase their knowledge stock (Almeida&Kogut, 1999; Song
et al., 2003; Luo & Zhang, 2016). Nevertheless, other mechanisms such as keeping a low proﬁle
through hiring instead of acquiringmight play a role for catching up to incumbents and overcom-
ing issues of liabilities and outsidership.
The article uses exploratory analysis of interviews with technical experts hired by Huawei abroad
in order to avoid the company-narrative of the management level (Tokatli, 2015) and get insights
into the micro-processes (Doz, 2011). The analysis is based on inductive category building to stay
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open to new categories and interpretations (Gibbs, 2018). The role of oﬀshore experts is concep-
tualized through their skills, in particular experience, technical knowledge and language as well as
embeddedness, encompassing their contacts and reputation.
One of the central ﬁndings in article two is that the oﬀshore experts’ main task is to create new
ideas. Theseﬁndings togetherwith theﬁndings fromarticle onegive cause for questioningHuawei’s
domestic innovation capability, even though the company today sells state-of-the-art technology.
Therefore, the third article investigates more in depth the location of Huawei’s innovative activi-
ties and the internal orchestration of its outputs.
To obtain a more detailed picture of the spatial pattern of Huawei’s innovative activity, article
three focuses on a comparison of R&D tasks abroad and at home to gain insights on howHuawei
mastered its leap from a follower to a leader in the telecommunications industry (Mathews, 2002,
2006; Poon et al., 2006). The speciﬁc focus here is on innovative versus output capability, the
latter enabling latecomers to produce state-of-the-art products before having caught up on inno-
vation capability through external sourcing of ideas for new products (Awate et al., 2012).
In order to unfold Huawei’s innovative activities, the article uses a mixed-methods approach by
combining interviewandpatentdata (Hurmerinta-Peltomäki&Nummela, 2006;Creswell&Plano
Clark, 2011). The interview data is used to inductively study the tasks performed by the oﬀshore
experts in contrast to the tasks of their colleagues in China. Moreover the internal cooperation
and information sharing within the company is another question of the qualitative analysis. The
results of the ﬁrst part of the analysis are then discussed in the context of the existing literature to
develop deductive hypothesis for the quantitative analysis. Because we know that one of the main
tasks for the oﬀshore experts is to develop ideas and transfer them toChina, ideas are used as unit
of observation for the patent data analysis. The analysis uses the new-to-the-ﬁrm combination of
technologies on patents as a proxy for new ideas (Fleming, 2001; Kim et al., 2016). The creation
and transfer of the ideas are then analyzed in a time-to-eventmodel that aims at explaining the time
between the ﬁrst observation of the idea and the date of the transfer between oﬀshore and domes-
tic locations. The results of both the qualitative and the quantitative analysis are then integrated
to draw conclusions, which will be discussed further in the article as well as in the conclusion of
this dissertation.
19
Chapter 2
Oﬀshore versus domestic: Can EMMNCs
reach higher R&D quality abroad?
Authors: Kerstin J. Schäfer, Ingo Liefner
Status: Published December 2017 in Scientometrics 113 (3), p. 1349-1370
Abstract
In the current discourse about the technological development of emerging market multinational
companies (EMMNCs), the internationalization of research and development (R&D) activities
is increasingly discussed as a strategy for catching-up to establishedMNCs. EMMNCs attempt
to use international R&D to tap into technologically superior resources abroad which are not
available to them in their home market. This study compares the performance of domestic and
oﬀshoreR&Dactivities to look intoEMMNCs’ ability to conducthigh-qualityR&Dabroad.We
use theChinese telecommunication equipmentmanufacturerHuawei as a best practice case study.
To map their worldwide patent quality pattern, we propose a multiple-patent-oﬃce-approach to
ensure a balanced view on their activities with data from SIPO, USPTO and EPO.We also em-
ploy three diﬀerent measures to capture diﬀerent dimensions of patent quality. The results of
the empirical model support the assumption of higher quality for patents with knowledge from
advanced oﬀshore locations.
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2.1 Introduction
In the light of the increasing importance of knowledge as an asset for economic growth, the sourc-
ing of knowledge created abroad has become an important strategy for companies. Emergingmar-
ket multinational companies (EM MNCs) in particular depend on knowledge from abroad to
upgrade their production as well as management, and facilitate catching up to establishedMNCs
(Luo & Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2002). Besides absorbing knowledge-spillovers from foreign com-
panies in their homemarket (Görg &Greenaway, 2004), EMMNCs have started to actively seek
complementary knowledge abroad (Chen et al., 2012). Although it is risky for young and inexperi-
encedMNCs to operate R&D activities abroad, the need to seek higher-level knowledge is rooted
in the inability to acquire it in their home market. In contrast to the more common strategy of
buying inR&D from established companies abroad in the form ofM&As, only a small number of
EMMNCs so far have started to set up their ownR&Dactivities from scratch outside their home
country (Awate et al., 2015; Di Minin et al., 2012; Hsu et al., 2015). In this study, we evaluate this
upcoming and still under-researched phenomenon to analyze whether conducting R&D abroad
can substitute for a lack of knowledge resources at the latecomer’s home base and help the EM
MNC to become competitively viable on a global scale.
We use theChinese telecommunication equipmentmanufacturerHuaweiTechnologiesCo. Ltd.
(Huawei) as a case study. In just a few years, Huawei managed to become the largest applicant for
patents at the world intellectual property organization (WIPO) and is the strongest applicant
for patents among EMMNCs worldwide (WIPO, 2015). Moreover, Huawei’s unique focus on
greenﬁeld R&D abroad instead of the more common M&As along with its huge international-
ization success makes it a best practice example for other emerging companies. We are therefore
interested in their ability to overcome the liabilities imposed on them in the context of R&D
oﬀ-shoring (Zaheer, 1995; Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Chinese MNCs in particular face strong
liabilities when internationalizing caused by a large cultural and institutional distance to most ad-
vancedmarkets (He&Lyles, 2008;Child&Rodriguez, 2005). Therefore, despiteHuawei’s strong
position within China, the question remains as to whether they are able to overcome those liabili-
ties through their vigorous eﬀort in R&D internationalization. If so, we argue that their oﬀshore
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R&D will outperform their domestic activities because it provides them with access to state-of-
the-art knowledge not available to them in their home market. This can compensate Huawei for
their home country disadvantage and enables them to produce advanced knowledge themselves.
A very widely-used form of measuring R&D output performance is patent statistics (Frietsch
et al., 2010; Penner-Hahn & Shaver, 2005; Singh, 2008; Trajtenberg, 1990). We use patent data
to assess diﬀerent quality dimensions of patents evolving from an international background and
compare it to the quality of domestic patents. In contrast to other studies, we explicitly use data
from multiple patent oﬃces to respond adequately to the fact that looking at data from various
oﬃces each time provides a diﬀerent point of view and helps to rule out home bias (Criscuolo,
2006; Messinis, 2011). For EM MNCs in particular, we expect the pictures of patents applied
for at their home base to diﬀer in comparison to those applied for abroad. We use the inventors’
addresses provided by the patent documents as a proxy for the EMMNC’s worldwide R&D lo-
cations. This is a common proxy for location when looking at patents byMNCs, as many tend to
apply for patents only through the domestic headquarters (TerWal & Boschma, 2009). We ﬁnd
that this is also true for Huawei.
Our contribution to the existing literature onEMMNCs’ knowledge sourcing is a thorough anal-
ysis ofHuawei’s ability to reach betterR&Dperformance through greenﬁeldR&Dabroad than at
their home base. The research hypotheses state that innovative performance is better for patents
which involve inventors living and working abroad, and in advanced markets in particular, than
for patents only involving inventors living in the EMMNC’s home country. This would imply
that strategic investments can compensate for a deﬁcient home base and enable EM MNCs to
conduct cutting edge research. We also, for the ﬁrst time, explicitly employ a methodology that
includes data from three diﬀerent patent oﬃces to ensure a more diﬀerentiated perspective on
R&D performance, therefore assuring the robustness of our ﬁndings.
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2.2 EMMNCs’ research and development internationalization
2.2.1 Perspectives and shortcoming in this emerging ﬁeld of literature
Within the research on internationalization, R&D internationalization is a more recent focus.
We ﬁnd that the existing literature so far focuses mostly on R&D internationalization of AM
MNCsoronEMMNCs’ internationalization ingeneral. R&DinternationalizationofEMMNC
to access advanced knowledge abroad is a more recent ﬁeld of attention, as it is a more recent
phenomenon. As of today, only a small number of studies have conducted research on diﬀerent
aspects of this topic. Chen et al. (2012) ﬁnd that those EM MNCs internationalizing in mar-
kets with strong technological resources show better technological capabilities at home. Awate
et al. (2015) focus on the diﬀerences in R&D internationalization between EMMNCs and AM
MNCs, and study their knowledge ﬂows between the headquarters and the subsidiaries. Jindra
et al. (2014) look at the European Union as a destination for EM MNCs’ R&D international-
ization and sub-national location choice. Hsu et al. (2015) investigate the eﬀects of intensity and
diversity ofR&D internationalization on innovative performance in general andﬁnd that interna-
tionalization experience has a positive moderating eﬀect on performance for the whole company.
Studies onR&D internationalization fromChina in particular conclude that established theories
about AMMNCs’ R&D oﬀ-shoring do not suﬃce to explain EMMNCs’ internationalization,
as their initial condition and the drivers for internationalization diﬀer (Child &Rodriguez, 2005;
DiMinin et al., 2012).
Reviewing the literature shows that a more detailed picture of EM MNCs’ international R&D
strategies remains to be drawn. It has not been shown whether EMMNCs are really able to con-
duct higher-quality R&D abroad. We contribute to the literature through analyzing the output
quality of oﬀshore R&D in comparison to domestic R&D to see whether the EMMNC is able
to increase their R&D performance when abroad. We also use data from multiple patent oﬃces,
including the EMMNC’s home-oﬃce as well as the data from the US and European oﬃces, to
obtain a more comprehensive picture of the EM MNC’s patent quality pattern. This provides
us with a clear view of the underlying strategy in R&D and the worldwide pattern of the output
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quality.
2.2.2 Risks and liabilities for EMMNCs’ R&D oﬀ-shoring
R&Dinternationalization is risky, especially forEMMNCswith a lack of experience inmanaging
worldwideR&Dnetworks. The physical distance between the headquarters and the oﬀshore units
induces diﬃculties in communication frequency and quality. Moreover, synergy and scale poten-
tials in R&D cannot be exploited, which can lead to lower eﬃciency (von Zedtwitz &Gassmann,
2002). Further problems concerning R&D internationalization include immobility of personnel,
less control over research results and the risk of parallel development (Gassmann& vonZedtwitz,
1998). The risk of knowledge spillover abroad in particular raises the question of whether itmight
be safer to keep high-level R&D in the home market. Also, concentrated technological develop-
ment at home is easier to manage compared to the risky coordination of global R&D.
Another diﬃculty for EMMNCs is the knowledge gap which they have to overcome in order to
conduct successfulR&Dabroad. Cohen&Levinthal (1990) state that the company’s prior knowl-
edge in a given ﬁeld is crucial for being able to acquire state-of-the-art knowledge. Singh (2008)
also ﬁnds the ability to integrate knowledge into the ﬁrm’s knowledge base to be more crucial
to aMNC’s innovative performance than the sole venture of worldwide knowledge sourcing. He
warns that coordination costs of internationalR&Dcanbehigher than the gains if theMNCdoes
not possess the absorptive capacity needed. The knowledge gap between EMMNCs’ knowledge
stock and the knowledge that they wish to access abroad is mostly higher than for AMMNCs.
Therefore, it is even more diﬃcult for them to incorporate the new knowledge. Furthermore,
they lack international experience, management know-how and reputation, which also increases
their costs as well as their risks (Hsu et al., 2015).
Besides this, EMMNCs also have to face liabilities of foreignness in their target markets. These
are costs only faced by non-domestic ﬁrms for entering a foreignmarket (Zaheer, 1995). The costs
are determinedby the constellationof home andhostmarket. In particular, the distance in culture,
institutions, language as well as spatial distance between the two determine the costs (Denk et al.,
2012). Moreover, the particular characteristics of the MNC determine whether these liabilities
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can be overcome. There is evidence that liabilities can make oﬀshore R&D less successful than
domestic R&D (Sofka, 2006). Johanson &Vahlne (2009) emphasize the role of networks for in-
ternationalization with the term liabilities of outsidership. They claim the MNC needs to build
up connections at each location to overcome liabilities of outsidership from the business network.
Those ties are based on trust and commitment and help the MNC to gain crucial knowledge on
the market and the business environment (Johanson &Vahlne, 2009).
In comparison to AMMNCs, EMMNCs have to overcome even more of those liabilities when
internationalizing their R&D into advanced markets because of greater cultural and institutional
distance. With an increase in liabilities, the MNC’s oﬀshore unit’s performance is likely to de-
crease (Miller & Parkhe, 2002; Miller & Eden, 2006). Therefore, internationalization of EM
MNCs in advanced markets can make it harder to achieve high oﬀshore R&D performance.
2.2.3 Drivers of R&D internationalization
MNC’s R&D internationalizations are driven by various motivations. Kuemmerle (1997) dif-
ferentiated between home-base-exploiting and home-base-augmenting strategies in establishing
R&D sites abroad. EMMNCs are thought to aim frequently at accessing knowledge not avail-
able to them in their homemarket, which falls under augmentingmotives. These motives include
seeking highly qualiﬁed human capital abroad that is not available in their home market, as well
as desirable research partners such as universities or public R&D institutes. Reasons other than
home-base-augmenting that particularly apply for EMMNCs include institutional restraints and
weak intellectual property rights in their homemarket (Hsu et al., 2015). In general, monetary ad-
vantages, proximity to markets and improving the company’s image abroad can also be reasons to
go abroad (Gassmann & von Zedtwitz, 1998). Most ventures are driven by more than one objec-
tive.
From a latecomer perspective, R&D internationalization for EMMNCs is especially useful be-
cause it can help to compensate for latecomer disadvantages such as lack of knowledge and experi-
ence (Hsu et al., 2015; Mathews, 2002). Mathews (2002) states that companies can use their late-
comer status to quickly acquire state-of-the-art technology that had to be developed by advanced
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companies over time. This can promote leapfrogging and hence rapid upgrading of international
market positions (Mathews, 2002). Leapfrogging can even create competitive advantages over es-
tablishedMNCs because the EMMNC can bypass earlier technological stages that AMMNCs
had to go through (Chen, 2004; Mathews, 2002). This creates opportunities for EMMNCs to
compete not only in low-tech industries, but also in new and evolving industries. EMMNCs from
Asia are particularly known for sourcing sophisticated technology in advanced economies to up-
grade their knowledge base (Poon et al., 2006).
Adistinctive feature of home-base-augmenting strategies is the relationbetween theMNC’s head-
quarters and its R&D subsidiaries. Augmenting is motivated by absorbing knowledge at the oﬀ-
shore location using knowledge from competitors or research institutions. The knowledge is then
transferred back to the MNC’s headquarters to incorporate it into the company’s knowledge
stock (Awate et al., 2015; Kuemmerle, 1997). If the oﬀshore R&D unit is successful, it achieves
a higher knowledge level than the headquarters in certain ﬁelds.
To summarize the theory from chapter 2.2.3, we notice that a main motive for EMMNC’s R&D
internationalization is the absorption of knowledge that is not available to them in their domestic
market. Therefore, we would expect their oﬀshore R&D to display higher quality than at home.
The problem here, as described in chapter 2.2.2, is that they face high risks and liabilities abroad
that might decrease the success of their oﬀshore R&D. Therefore, the question remains as to
whether EMMNCs are able to overcome those risks and liabilities and accomplish high quality
R&D abroad. We believe that some strong innovation-based EM MNCs are able to overcome
liabilities and reach their goal. Based on these considerations, we establish our ﬁrst research hy-
pothesis: EM MNCs can achieve higher R&D quality at their oﬀshore locations than at their
domestic labs.
2.2.4 Locations for international R&D
Chen et al. (2012) state that the need to go abroad is based on the notion that knowledge can
be spatially bound. State-of-the-art technology can be tied to research laboratories, local research
networks, universities and R&D institutes, suppliers and competitors, and ﬁnally the researchers
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Fig. 2.1: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D ﬁnanced from abroad in 2012, Own calculation
with data fromOECD
themselves. Tacit knowledge in particular forces EMMNCs to go abroad to acquire it. To tap
into those knowledge sources, the companies need not only to be physically present with their
R&D, but also to enter the local research networks (Chen et al., 2012). In order to ﬁnd the best
location for international R&D, EMMNCs need to identify their knowledge gaps and seek loca-
tions to complement their prior knowledge (Serapio & Dalton, 1999). The choice of location is
also driven by the quality of knowledge that theMNC expects at a certain location (Kuemmerle,
1997). Therefore, R&Dunits fromEMMNCs aremostly found in countries with advanced tech-
nological knowledge (Chen et al., 2012). Consequently, certain countries are more attractive for
global R&D than others. Figure 2.1 shows the amount of gross domestic expenditure on R&D
(GERD) that is ﬁnanced from abroad for each location. The chart displays the top ten locations
of incoming foreign direct investment in R&D. As we can see, the USA is still by far the most
attractive location for R&D investment. Their GERD from abroad is about double the amount
of the second highest number, which is for the UK. Also, the top ten locations are mostly Eu-
ropean countries, along with Israel and Canada. Within Europe, the UK is followed by France
andGermany, which are close to each other. The chart supports the notion that advancedmarket
economies are most attractive for international R&D. Based on these notions, we augment our
research with a second hypothesis: advanced markets are more important as oﬀshore locations
for R&D by EMMNCs than other emerging markets.
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2.3 Case study description
2.3.1 Obstacles for Chinese MNCs’ internationalization
The special case ofChinese internationalization and the particular liabilities they face has recently
received some attention in the literature. Cultural and institutional distance are described as par-
ticularly high for ChineseMNCs. He & Lyles (2008) emphasize their lack of experience in doing
business with western companies as a drawback for Chinese MNCs. China has been a centrally
planned economy for decades, which caused more informal ways of doing business to be estab-
lished (He & Lyles, 2008). Child & Rodriguez (2005) add that the high institutional dependence
for companies in China and therefore the higher institutional distance to foreign markets poses
an obstacle to internationalization. Another obstacle that is particularly impeding Chinese in-
ternationalization is the negative image that Chinese companies have abroad. Many advanced
markets have expressed concerns about Chinese MNCs locating oﬀshore activities there (Si &
Liefner, 2014). In particular, those concerns are related to their reputation for only producing
low-quality output, non-transparency of business activities and the strong inﬂuence of the Chi-
nese state as well as the theft of intellectual property and copying. This negative image is a huge
hurdle for entering local business as well as research networks and makes it harder to ﬁnd quali-
ﬁed personnel (Si & Liefner, 2014). These are particularly crucial for the internationalization of
R&D activity, as sharing knowledge relies heavily on interpersonal trust. Chinese companies are
extremely interesting objects of study in this context because they rapidly entered the world mar-
ket with their good-enough technology and now strive to be competitive in more sophisticated
technologies (Chen &Wen, 2016; Liefner & Zeng, 2016; Nahm & Steinfeld, 2014; Fu & Gong,
2011). This is also true for our case study company.
2.3.2 The Case StudyMNC: Huawei
WechoseHuawei as a case study because of its innovation-centered development strategy and the
rapid expansion of its international R&D activities. According to its Annual Report, more than
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70,000 of a total workforce of about 150,000 are R&D employees (Low, 2007). Looking at the
R&D output, Huawei is the worldwide leading ﬁrm when it comes to patent applications under
the patent cooperation treaty system (PCT) (WIPO, 2015). This enormous international surge
of patent applications raises the question of the underlying innovative strategy. KnowingHuawei
from previous research, such as Liefner et al. (2019), we assume that this is the outcome of an ex-
pansive international knowledge-acquiring strategy. This strategy includes being one of the few
EMMNCs that use greenﬁeld investment to set up R&D facilities abroad, which makes it a very
unique object to study. This study therefore provides a potential strategic alternative to the better
researched knowledge-acquisition throughM&As.
The core technologies that the case study companyHuawei provides are telecommunications net-
work equipment, IT products and solutions, and smart devices. Founded in the late 1980s in Shen-
zhen, Guangdong province, China, the company started as a low-cost producer that served the
otherwise neglected domestic rural markets and beneﬁted fromChinaś growing and increasingly
demanding home market (Fan, 2011; Low, 2007; Mu & Lee, 2005). From 2001 onwards, Huawei
has continuously served advanced markets with their products as well (Fu & Sun, 2015). Today,
Huawei is the worldś largest telecommunications equipment company (Wan et al., 2015). It is also
one of the few privately owned companies among the state-owned-dominated national champions
in China.
Even if most of Huaweiś R&D is carried out at the headquarters in Shenzhen, Huawei’s R&D
activities have shown a remarkable internationalization dynamic. Huawei has set upR&D centers
in many regions, including advanced markets such as the US (e.g. Silicon Valley in 1993, Dallas
in 1999, Plano, TX, 2001) and the EU (e.g. Stockholm in 2001, Munich in 2008) (Fan, 2011).
Huawei’s foreign R&D centers are often located in places where Huawei’s competitors carry out
theirR&Daswell. While the extent and scale ofHuawei’s overseasR&Dpresence is absolutely re-
markable (Fan, 2011), it is the Shenzhen capabilities center that assesses the compan’s capabilities,
collects knowledge from its subsidiaries and diﬀuses knowledge to those subsidiaries that need it
(Fu & Sun, 2015). Through setting up R&D as greenﬁeld investment, the company ensures close
ties to its headquarters.
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2.4 Data and methods
2.4.1 Patent data
Patent data as indicator for innovation
As it signals new and commercializable technology, patent data is a frequently-used measurement
for innovation-related activity in innovation literature. Patent citations in particular have gained
attention as ameasurement for the technological importance of patents (Hall et al., 2005;Trajten-
berg, 1990). Nevertheless, the literature also discusses various shortcomings when using patent
data. Patents do not account for all of the innovative activities within a company and not all ob-
jects of innovation can be patented. The informative value of patent data also depends on the
sector that is analyzed (Grupp, 1998). In innovation-driven and technology-intensive industries,
patents play amore important role in protecting intellectual property. In those industries, patents
canbe used as proxies formost of the innovative activities. Other industries also use utilitymodels,
industrial design, copyrights, trademarks, corporate secrets or rapid commercializing to protect
intellectual property (Neuhäusler, 2012; WIPO, 2015). Furthermore, there can be strategic rea-
sons for patenting other than protecting a company’s innovations. These include blocking com-
petitors from using a certain technology, improving the company’s reputation or using patents
as exchange material in negotiations with cooperation partners (Blind et al., 2006). This means
that we have to be careful when interpreting patents as innovative indicators (Neuhäusler, 2012).
Therefore, we have to keep inmind that we can only analyze that part of the innovative activity of
Huawei that can be accessed through patent data. However, as patenting plays an important role
in the technology ﬁeld of digital communication in whichHuawei operates, it is still a solid proxy
to study their oﬀshoreR&Dquality. Aswe focus on the diﬀerences between patent quality within
one company we do not need to adjust for industry speciﬁc patenting behavior. Overall, Patent
data is one of the most frequently used and available proxies we have for innovative activity, if it is
interpreted attentively.
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Multiple patent oﬃce analysis
Fig. 2.2: Model of domestic patents and their relative quality ranking at diﬀerent patent oﬃces
Concerning our methodology, we ﬁnd that studies applying patent analysis to investigate R&D
internationalization of AM MNCs, such as Penner-Hahn & Shaver (2005), Lahiri (2010) and
Singh (2008), rely solely on data from the USPTO. This might be adequate for looking at AM
MNCs’ R&D internationalization, but does not provide enough information in the case of early
stages of R&D internationalization. EM MNCs’ R&D activity will in most cases be unequally
represented at their domestic and international patent oﬃces.
There is strong evidence that place of invention and place of application heavily correlate (Fri-
etsch & Schmoch, 2010). Most inventions that originate from China are taken to the Chinese
State Intellectual Property Oﬃce (SIPO) ﬁrst, but inventions originating from the US and Eu-
rope are likely to be taken ﬁrst to USPTO or the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) respectively.
Only a smaller number of patents are also ﬁled at other oﬃces. This is also true for the data we
use in this study. We ﬁnd that we can clearly see patents originating from the US being more
often applied at USPTO. We see this eﬀect for European patents at EPO as well, but it is less
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distinct than for the US patents.
Overall, most of Huawei’s patents are applied for in their domestic market. One reason for this,
despite a certain home base bias, is the relatively low quality of domestic patents. For example
until 2009, SIPO patents did not even have to be "new to the world" but only "new to themarket"
to be granted. We also know from previous research that the Chinese government is inﬂuencing
the patenting behavior of Chinese ﬁrms in various ways, such as patent subsidy programs (Dang
& Motohashi, 2015; Li et al., 2012; Liefner et al., 2016). These provide distorting incentives for
patenting other than innovative activity and can lead to a certainmismatch of patents and innova-
tion (Li et al., 2012). Dang&Motohashi (2015) ﬁnd that theChinese policy increases the number
of patents, while causing the quality of patents to decrease. Only the strongest patents can also
be applied for at USPTO or EPO, where their relative ranking in quality compare to the other
patents at the respective oﬃce changes as shown in ﬁure 2.
On another note, the database of EMMNCs’ home patent oﬃces is mostly the least reliable. We
ﬁnd that the data from SIPO is less complete than that of USPTO and EPO, especially when it
comes to citations. This weakens the reliability of SIPO patents as indicators of innovation, but
as SIPO isHuawei’s home patent oﬃce, analysis of patent data fromSIPO is vital for understand-
ing the EMMNCs’ patenting picture. This additionally emphasizes the advantage of analyzing
data frommore than one patent oﬃce separately.
2.4.2 The Datasets
Patent value and indicators
Patent value has diﬀerent dimensions depending on the stakeholders that assess it. Frietsch et al.
(2010) concentrate on ﬁve dimensions of patent value: technological value of the patent, radical
vs incremental innovations, economic value, social value and strategic value. In our case study, we
focus on the dimensions of technological and economic value, according to their relevance for
our research question. Those dimensions are the ones most important to latecomer MNCs. We
exclude strategic value because it does not foremost aim at contributing to theMNC’s knowledge
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stock and therefore is not subject to our analysis. To measure patent quality concerning techno-
logical and economic value the literature suggests a variety of indicators that can be obtained from
patent data. After several tests with possible indicators we decided to chose forward citations and
backward citations as indicators for technological value and patent family size for economic value.
Trajtenberg (1990) emphasized the use of patent citations as a patent value indicator. The num-
ber of forward citations shows the amount of subsequent research that builds upon the patent,
which is discussed to reﬂect newness and technological importance (Albert et al., 1991; Carpenter
et al., 1981). It has been the most frequently used and validated indicator in the literature (Hall
et al., 2005; Frietsch et al., 2010). Fast recognition of patents shortly after publication indicates
strong activity in the research area (Lanjouw & Schankermann, 2004). The literature proposes
using a certain time frame to measure forward citations accounting for the time lag between ap-
plication, publication and citation of the patent (Squicciarini et al., 2013; van Zeebroeck & van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2011). Therefore, we apply a four-year time frame. Since the
most current data available includes patent data up to 2014, we only use patents from 2010 and
before when looking at forward citations. For this indicator, we only use patents that were cited
at least once to ﬁt themodel. Furthermore, as citation rules diﬀer between patent oﬃces, it is very
diﬃcult to compare patents applied for at diﬀerent oﬃces directly. This is another - but more
technical - reason why we decided to analyze the data from each oﬃce separately.
Another indicator that we use is the number of backward citations, which can be an indicator for
the underlying knowledge breadth of the patent (Harhoﬀ et al., 2003; Rosenkopf &Nerkar, 2001;
vanZeebroeck&vanPottelsberghede laPotterie, Bruno, 2011). In the patent document, backward
citations are used to outline the state-of-the-art technology upon which the invention builds. The
broader the technical scope of the patent, the more backward citations the document is expected
to have. The indicator "number of backward citations" has the advantage of being available much
more promptly than forward citations.
The indicator "family size" is used to measure the geographic scope of a patent (van Zeebroeck &
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2011). It displays the number of patent oﬃces worldwide
at which the invention has been applied for. This is a more direct measure of expected monetary
value, as companies have to pay for each application in each country separately. It therefore rep-
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resents economic or market value as well as the international relevance of the invention (Lanjouw
et al., 1998; Fischer & Leidinger, 2014).
We also tested several other patent quality indicators discussed in the literature, such as claims, le-
gal status and number of technology classes (Lanjouw & Schankermann, 2004; Squicciarini et al.,
2013; van Zeebroeck & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2011), but as they did not prove to
be solid indicators, we omitted them. Additionally, we used the number of inventors as a variable
for comparison during analysis, but did not include it in the results section because it is a quality
input indicator rather than an output indicator.
Datasets
The data for our research was compiled using the EPOWorldwide Patent Statistical Database
(PATSTAT) version accessible at the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and InnovationResearch
in Karlsruhe. The database is provided by the European patent oﬃce to assist patent research.
It contains patent data of more than 50 patent oﬃces worldwide. Despite the high reliability of
data, at PATSTAT we can also obtain data that is not accessible on the website of some of the
national patent oﬃces. Most importantly, we can access the address of each inventor for SIPO
patents instead of being limited to the ﬁrst inventor’s address.
To identify all patents belonging to Huawei, we searched the database for "Huawei", "Futurewei"
and related spellings. As a next step, we cleaned the 151 results so that only subsidiaries of the
Huawei group were taken into account. Our dataset includes all major subsidiaries of theHuawei
group except forHiSilicon andProvenHonourCapital, which either account for only a very small
fraction of patents or operate in ﬁnancing (Huawei, 2014). To draw the most comprehensive
picture possible of patents that include inventors living or working overseas, we obtained patent
data from three diﬀerent patent oﬃces. The ﬁrst one is Huawei’s home patent oﬃce SIPO in
China. As we know, there is a certain advantage for domestic applicants, and we ﬁnd that Huawei
accordingly applies formost of its patents at SIPO.Frietsch et al. (2010)mention that this eﬀect is
drivenby the speciﬁc interest that companies have in their homemarket aswell as lower costswhen
applying inventions in their homemarket and in their domestic language. Chapter 2.4.1 discusses
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Table 2.1: Dataset Descriptives: Huawei’s patents at the three patent oﬃces
SIPO USPTO EPO
Number of patents 40,408 7,363 6,128
Time frame 1995 - 2013 1998 - 2014 1999 - 2013
China-only inventor patents 96.0 % 74.1 % 92.7 %
Patents granted n/s 40.8 % 30.5%
Patents also applied for under PCT 36.08 % 85.68 % 93.52 %
Average number of inventors 2.19 2.55 2.55
patent quality and international application in more detail. As Table 2.1 shows, the number of
patents applied for at SIPO is about six times the number of patents applied for at each of the
other two oﬃces: USPTO and EPO.We choseUSPTO and EPO for our analysis, as they cover
the regions most attractive for R&D investment (see Figure 2.1), and we know that Huawei has
been conducting R&D there (see chapter 2.3.2). We also looked at patents ﬁled under the PCT
to get a better understanding of Huawei’s patent pattern. However, we do not include these in
our analysis, as PCT applications are processed diﬀerently from applications at national patent
oﬃces that actually grant patents. We still use the PCT data to verify our ﬁndings from the
national oﬃces’ data.
Table 2.1 shows that Huawei ﬁrst patented intellectual property in 1995 in China. Three years
later, theMNCstarted to apply for patents atUSPTOand one year later at EPO. Patents applied
for at USPTO are the most likely to have non-Chinese residents among their inventors, whereas
only four percent of SIPO patents included at least one oﬀshore inventor. We can also see that
SIPO patents are less likely to be further applied for under the PCT and have a slightly lower
number of inventors than patents ﬁled at the other two oﬃces. The datasets are not disjoint and
overlap concerning patents applied for at more than one of the three patent oﬃces.
The location of inventors is obtained from the inventor’s address on the patent as suggested by
TerWal&Boschma (2009), because the applicant of almost all patents is theHuawei headquarters
in Shenzhen rather than the local subsidiaries. The address is intended to display the residence of
the inventor, but can also be found to refer to the address of the local workplace. Both addresses
are very good proxies for the location of the patent’s knowledge. Besides the quality indicators
and addresses, we collected data on the priority year, the number of inventors, the technology
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class as WIPO 35 following Schmoch (2008) and the patent oﬃces at which it was applied for.
The statistical unit that we use is patents rather than patent families, as we look at each dataset
separately.
2.5 Descriptive ﬁndings
2.5.1 Worldwide distribution of oﬀshore inventors
Fig. 2.3: Overview of worldwide residency of oﬀshore inventors at Huawei
Figure 2.3 shows the six most important residencies of inventors and distinguishes between the
three patent oﬃces. Themost eye-catching is the number of patents with inventors from theUS.
It is the largest number of patents by oﬀshore inventors for each of the three patent oﬃces. As
we use absolute numbers, we can also see that most of the oﬀshore inventor patents are applied
for at USPTO, except for the two East Asian countries. This is interesting, as we know from
Table 2.1 that the absolute number of SIPOpatents is six times higher than the number of patents
applied for atUSPTO.Nevertheless, USPTOhas amuch bigger share, 25 percent compared to 4
percent, of oﬀshore inventor patents, and this is why their absolute number of oﬀshore inventor
patents is almost 300 patents more. We see that inventors from South Korea and Japan play a
larger role in patents at the SIPO than at the other two patent oﬃces, which was expected due to
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their proximity to China. The number of absolute applications at EPO is the lowest.
Table 2.2: Inventor Residency at the three patent oﬃces
SIPO USPTO EPO
Oﬀshore Inventor Teams
Only Oﬀshore 22.5 % 65.5 % 77.1 %
China and Oﬀshore 77.5 % 34.5 % 22.9 %
Oﬀshore Inventor Residency*
North America 64.6 % 81.7 % 65.7 %
Europe 20.2 % 18.9 % 35.2 %
East and Southeast Asia 15.3 % 2.2 % 2.9 %
Rest of EM 1.2 % 2.0 % 2.5 %
North America: USA, Canada
Europe: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Czech, Ireland, Germany, Swe-
den
East and Southeast Asia: Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Guam,Malaysia
Rest of EM: SouthAfrica, Russia, India, Brazil,Mexico, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Nigeria, Cameroon, UnitedArab Emirates,
Grenada, Virgin Islands, Samoa
Note: Patents can be assigned to multiple inventor countries
* Percentage of oﬀshore-inventor-patents with at least one inventor living or working in this region
A look at Table 2.2 provides a more comprehensive picture of patent applications concerning the
residency of inventors. The ﬁrst half of the table shows the structure of the inventor teams among
the oﬀshore inventor patents. We can see that at the foreign patent oﬃces, the inventor teams
mostly consist of oﬀshore inventors only. In contrast, the fraction of themixed inventor teams at
SIPO is more than three-quarters. The second half of the table shows the worldwide distribution
of inventors. Aswe already know that the bulk of patents have onlyChina-based inventors (seeTa-
ble 2.1), we only look at patents that have at least one oﬀshore inventor. We can see that for each
database, the percentage of patents that have at least have one inventor fromNorth America is by
far the highest. We also see a bias favoring inventors from the region that the patent oﬃces cover:
forUSPTO, the percentage forNorthAmerican inventors is higher than at the other oﬃces, and
the percentage of European inventors at EPO is also around 15 percent higher than at the other
oﬃces. Furthermore, East and Southeast Asia play a much bigger role among the oﬀshore loca-
tions for patents applied for at SIPO, Huawei’s home patent oﬃce. All other locations that we
ﬁnd in the patent datasets are found to be either emerging or developing nations that make up
only a small fraction of oﬀshore patents.
To sum up, we ﬁnd with regard to hypothesis two that themost important locations are advanced
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markets: the US, Sweden, Germany and Canada. Emerging markets play a minor role as R&D
locations for Huawei. We also ﬁnd that advanced markets in proximity to the company’s head-
quarters, such as South Korea and Japan, play a smaller role than we expected.
2.5.2 Technology ﬁelds
Table 2.3: Patents assigned to major technology ﬁelds
Technology Class SIPO USPTO EPO
Sector Field
Electrical Engineering 6: Computer technology 15.6 % 30.6 % 12.7 %
Electrical Engineering 8: Semiconductors 83.4 % 69.3 % 87.1 %
Instruments 10: Measurement 1.1 % 2.6 % 0.6 %
Mechanical Engineering 30: Thermal processes &
apparatus
6.8 % 7.9 % 8.4 %
Note: Only valid cases, one patent can be assigned to multiple technology ﬁelds
We also look at the technology ﬁelds to which the patents are assigned to see whether they diﬀer
between locations. Around 90 percent of patents are assigned to only one technology ﬁeld, while
about 9 percent are assigned to two. Only a few patents are assigned to three or more technology
ﬁelds. This is similar for all three oﬃces. The most common ﬁeld for Huawei’s inventions is
"Semiconductors", with around 85 percent of patents assigned to it at SIPO and EPO, and almost
70 percent at USPTO, as shown in Table 2.3. The second largest ﬁeld, "Computer technology",
also shows a discrepancy between SIPO and EPO on the one hand and USPTO on the other.
At USPTO, over 15 percent more patents are assigned to this ﬁeld compared to the other two
oﬃces. This is because software is generally patentable at USPTO, which is not possible without
restrictions at EPOandSIPO (Hall &MacGarvie, 2010). EPOcontains a slightly higher fraction
of patents applied for in the third biggest ﬁeld "Thermal processes and apparatus" than the other
two oﬃces. Finally, the ﬁeld of measurement shows a stronger use at USPTO than at the other
oﬃces, but has an overall low percentage of patents applied for at each oﬃce.
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2.6 Empirical models
2.6.1 Model description
Fig. 2.4: Empirical Model
Figure 2.4 summarizes the variables and the structure of the empirical models. The ﬁgure shows
that we use four input measurements in each model. The predictor variable for each model is the
dichotomous variable "Oﬀshore Inventors", used as a categorical variable. As control variables,
we also use the age of the patent, the number of inventors and dummy variables for technology
classes. For each of the three patent oﬃces, we calculate three diﬀerentmodels, one for each of the
following quality measurements: family size, backward citations and forward citations. Since the
response variables include only count variables, we use generalized linear models (GLM) instead
of standard OLS regression as a multivariate model (Zuur et al., 2009). This approach is typical
for the analysis of patent data (Neuhäusler, 2012; Singh, 2008). These models ﬁt best if the mean
is less than ten and the variance is similar to the mean (Zuur et al., 2009). In Table 2.4, we can see
that this is true for most of the indicators except for backward citations at USPTO and EPO.
Therefore, we need to be more careful when interpreting the outcome of those two models.
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We apply a Poisson log model for the dependent variable family size. For the dependent variables
backward and forward citations, we have to use a Negative binomial regression model, as we ﬁnd
them to be over-dispersed. This means the variance of the response variable is greater than the
model expects, which distorts the outcome (Zuur et al., 2009). In Table 2.4, we can see that for
those variables, the variance is much bigger than the mean. Also, a value greater than 1 for the
Goodness of ﬁt indicator Chi-Square Value / d.f. for the variables indicates the over-dispersion
(see Tables 2.5 - 2.7). As the samples are each quite large, we can use the Negative binomial model
as an alternative.
Table 2.4: Quality indicator descriptives
Family size Backward Citations Forward Citations
SIPO USPTO EPO SIPO USPTO EPO SIPO USPTO EPO
Mean 1.8 3.98 4.56 7.16 17.07 13.34 2.09 4.67 3.94
SD 1.39 1.75 1.48 7.67 15.14 10.97 2.08 5.07 4.65
Variance 1.93 3.07 2.18 58.83 229.22 120.36 4.31 25.74 21.58
Range 1 - 17 1 - 14 1 - 14 1 - 99 1 - 216 1 - 216 1 - 50 1 - 50 1 - 50
2.6.2 Goodness of ﬁt measurements and data coverage
Tables 2.5 - 2.7 show the results of the Poisson and negative binomial Regression for each dataset.
The Goodness of ﬁt measurement "Pearson Chi-Square / d.f." shown in the table indicates the
quality of the models. Ideally, the Pearson Chi-Square / d.f. measurement is between 1 and 1.5,
which is true for most of the models, as we already use Negative binomial models for the over-
dispersed indicators. Only family size in the USPTO and EPO datasets has a value lower than
1, which indicates under-dispersion. This means that contrary to over-dispersion, the variance of
the response variable is lower than themean, whichwe can also see inTable 2.4. However, as we do
not have too many explanatory variables or outliers, there is no need to correct for it (Zuur et al.,
2009). Another goodness of ﬁt measure is the omnibus test that shows the overall signiﬁcance of
the model over an intercept-only model. For our models, all values indicate signiﬁcance.
Another measurement we need to have a look at before interpreting the data is the percentage of
cases included. We can see that we have information on family size for almost all patents in our
datasets. Backward citation also represents most of the data for USPTO and EPO, but only cov-
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ers 9 percent of SIPO patents. This is due to the quality of data for this variable at SIPO. Before
2009 in particular, only a small percentage of patents contains information on backward citations.
This means that we need to be careful when interpreting this model, as it only represents a small
fraction of the dataset, mostly patents with a larger family size. Nevertheless, the total number
of patents included in the model is still more than 3,700 due to the size of the SIPO dataset. For
Forward Citation, we can see that the coverage is lower than for most of the other response vari-
able models, but as we only include patents with at least one citation for statistical reasons, this
explains the numbers. They still, however, represent a large enough part of the datasets to inter-
pret. Overall, the EPO dataset is the most complete one but forward citation is the best available
for the USPTO dataset.
Table 2.5: Poisson and negative binomial regression models with data from SIPO - China
(1)
Family size
(2)
Backward Citations
(3)
Forward Citations
Intercept 0.622 1.032 0.358
Oﬀshore Inventors (B) 0.215*** (0.017) 0.109*** (0.035) 0.188*** (0.417)
Oﬀshore Inventors
EXP(B)
1.240 1.115 1.207
Age Included Included Included
Inventor Number Included Included Included
Technology dummies Included Included Included
Pearson Chi-square / d.f. 1.063 1.635 1.410
Probability distribution Poisson Negative binomial Negative binomial
Included cases 39,723 (98.5 %) 3,701 (9.2 %) 12,510 (40.0 %)
*: sign. at 0.1
**: sign. at 0.05
***: sign. at 0.01
2.6.3 Findings
In Tables 2.5 - 2.7, we provide the coeﬃcients (B) as well as the exponentiated values of the coef-
ﬁcients Exp(B), which can be interpreted as incident rate ratios. The values can be interpreted in
percentage terms.
For the response variable family size in the SIPO dataset, the oﬀshore inventor variable shows
a positive and signiﬁcant value (0.215***), which means that the size of patent families is larger
for patents that include at least one oﬀshore inventor. In more detail, this means that if we have
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Table 2.6: Poisson and negative binomial regression models with data fromUSPTO - USA
(1)
Family size
(2)
Backward Citations
(3)
Forward Citations
Intercept 1.080 1.973 0.083
Oﬀshore Inventors (B) -0.282*** (0.016) 0.098*** (0.022) 0.373*** (0.036)
Oﬀshore Inventors
EXP(B)
0.754 1.098 1.453
Age Included Included Included
Inventor Number Included Included Included
Technology dummies Included Included Included
Pearson Chi-square / d.f. 0.616 1.427 1.288
Probability distribution Poisson Negative binomial Negative binomial
Included cases 7,207 (97.9 %) 6,505 (88.3 %) 3,590 (70.9 %)
*: sign. at 0.1
**: sign. at 0.05
***: sign. at 0.01
Table 2.7: Poisson and negative binomial regression models with data from EPO - Europe
(1)
Family size
(2)
Backward Citations
(3)
Forward Citations
Intercept 1.192 1.952 -0.091
Oﬀshore Inventors (B) 0.057** (0.023) -0.223*** (0.035) 0.139* (0.078)
Oﬀshore Inventors
EXP(B)
1.059 0.08 1.149
Age Included Included Included
Inventor Number Included Included Included
Technology dummies Included Included Included
Pearson Chi-square / d.f. 0.398 1.343 1.358
Probability distribution Poisson Negative binomial Negative binomial
Included cases 6,068 (99.0 %) 6,074 (99.1 %) 2,524 (53.4 %)
*: sign. at 0.1
**: sign. at 0.05
***: sign. at 0.01
oﬀshore inventors in the inventor team, we have a 24 percent (EXP(B)=1.240) higher incident
rate for family size than for the reference group of China-only invented patents. We also see this
positive relation in the EPO dataset, but the incident rate and the signiﬁcance are lower. These
two coeﬃcients show that patents with patent teams that have at least one inventor from outside
the companies’ home base have a broader geographical scope. For the USPTO dataset, we see a
reverse relation. A coeﬃcient of -0.282 indicates a smaller family size when oﬀshore inventors are
included. This is likely to be due to the patentability of software in the US as well as their large
market size. WhenHuawei develops high-quality patents with foreign inventors in the US (with
82 percent of them living in the US, see Table 2.2), this might be because some kinds of software
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are patentable at USPTO, but not at the EPO or SIPO. Therefore, they can not be applied for at
other oﬃces. In Table 2.3, we can also see that the percentage of patents in the ﬁeld of computer
technology at USPTO is much higher than at the other oﬃces, which supports this theory. An-
other reason for a smaller family size at USPTOmight be that the patents developed in the US
are developed for the USmarket, which is a very big market itself, and there might be no need to
apply for them at further patent oﬃces. These pointsmight also be the reasonwhy the family size
models show under-dispersion at USPTO: the variance is lower than usual because many patents
are only applied for at USPTO.
The response variable backward citationswas included tomeasure theunderlyingknowledgebreadth
of the patent. In chapter 2.6.2, we note that we need to be careful with our interpretation, as the
variable does not fully ﬁt themodel andwe have a lownumber of cases included for SIPO.Overall,
we see a positive relation in the SIPO and USPTO dataset. The coeﬃcients are small but signif-
icant in both cases. For the EPO dataset, we see a negative and signiﬁcant relation, meaning that
patents that have at least one oﬀshore inventor have fewer backward citations. The diﬀering inci-
dent rates between the oﬃces can partly be attributed to the diﬀerent citation regulations between
the patent oﬃces. AtUSPTO,most citations aremade by the inventors rather than the patent ex-
aminer. Therefore, we ﬁnd that the interpretation of the variable makes most sense at this oﬃce,
as the relationbetween the knowledge used by the inventors and the citations theymake ismore di-
rect than at EPO. Besides those technical considerations, we also ﬁnd that backward citations are
subject to discussion in the literature concerning their informative value regarding patent quality.
Some scholars argue that many backward citations signal a more incremental innovation because
the patent is said to be built upon a lot of existing knowledge (Squicciarini et al., 2013). They
argue that break through innovations cannot cite many other patents because the technological
gap between them and the former state of technology is too wide. To summarize our thoughts on
backward citation, we ﬁnd it to be the least informative indicator for patent quality in our data
set.
For forward citations, we ﬁnd the clearest picture of the inﬂuence of oﬀshore inventors on patent
quality. The incident rate for the oﬀshore inventors at all three datasets indicates a positive rela-
tion. For the Chinese patent oﬃce, we ﬁnd a 20.7 percent incident rate, which is slightly lower
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than the one for themodel with family size as a dependent variable. TheUSPTOdataset displays
the highest exponentiated coeﬃcient with 45.3 percent. At EPO, the incident rate is lower (14.9
percent) and signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. This could again be an indication that diﬀering
citation rules between the oﬃces inﬂuence the outcome of the analysis when comparingUSPTO
and EPO.Overall, this variable clearly shows that the presence of oﬀshore inventors increases the
number of citations of the patent, and therefore indicates a higher technological value.
We additionally looked at the quality diﬀerences between the most important locations: USA,
Sweden, Germany and Canada. We ﬁnd that the numbers of inventors are too low to produce
signiﬁcant results when broken down to a single location and therefore refrain from interpreting
the results here. Nevertheless, we can see that patents fromSweden show the highest quality com-
pared to all other oﬀshore locations.
With regard to our ﬁrst research hypothesis, we learn that overall patents with oﬀshore inventors
do have a higher quality, which is true for all three patent oﬃces. Also, we obtain a more diﬀer-
entiated picture of patent quality and are able to learn more about our indicators through using
three diﬀerent patent oﬃces than we could learn from one.
2.7 Conclusion
Ourmajor empirical ﬁndings support our hypotheses that overall, despite facing liabilities abroad,
the inclusion of oﬀshore inventors in R&D (hypothesis 1) as well as choosing advanced markets
as R&D locations (hypothesis 2) increases the quality of innovation.
Our paper’s main theoretical contribution is threefold: ﬁrstly, our ﬁndings contribute to the lit-
erature on EMMNCs, providing empirical evidence for the fact that R&D internationalization
using greenﬁeld investment can be a successful approach towards incorporating new knowledge
into an EMMNC’s R&D and innovation. Secondly, enriching the discussion about R&D inter-
nationalization, our results highlight important particularities of EMMNCs, which are a quanti-
tative bias on patent applications at the less demanding home country oﬃce, and the achievement
of higher-quality R&D results at foreign locations and based on the contributions of foreign in-
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ventors. Thirdly, our ﬁndings indicate that EMMNCs’ R&D internationalization will reinforce
existing locational specializations and knowledge bases of the worldwide leading R&D locations.
Our paper’s major methodological contribution relates to the treatment of patent data from dif-
ferent oﬃces. The ﬁndings prove that using data from only one patent oﬃce might provide a
clearer but possibly wrong picture. Particularly for EM MNCs in the initial phase of R&D in-
ternationalization, multiple patent oﬃce analysis is strongly recommended in order to reveal the
entire picture. Overall, we ﬁnd that the analysis of the patent indicators family size and forward
citation provides suitable means for analyzing R&D quality despite the shortcomings discussed
in the literature.
The following limitations need to be addressed: we were not able to depict the most current pic-
ture of forward citations at Huawei, as we have to apply a four-year time frame. In the case of
Huawei, we still obtain a good insight because the company has a long record of patenting over-
seas, but it might be an obstacle for analyzing other emerging companies. Another limitation is
of course the case study approach. As a Chinese MNC, Huawei is in some respects a special case
among EMMNCs. Despite the high liabilities they experience abroad, they have a government
that provides strong support for internationalization such as subsidies and access to cheap credit.
This makes Chinese MNCs willing to take greater risks in their internationalization and results
in a fast pace of internationalization. Although we ﬁnd Huawei to be an insightful best practice
case, further research should shift the focus of analysis to either more industries or a broader ge-
ographical area. We also feel that the literature at this point could proﬁt from a more detailed
qualitative analysis of inventor biographies and networks concerning oﬀshore R&D.Moreover, a
closer look at the invention itself could help to gain more knowledge on oﬀshore patent quality.
An important managerial implication of this paper is that EM MNCs do not have to build up
sophisticated R&D capacity in their home market before they can achieve high R&D quality, in-
stead being able to use oﬀshoreR&D in the formof greenﬁeld investment. This strategy is able to
overcome LOF and LOO abroad and provides a successful alternative to M&As. It requires EM
MNCs to set upR&D laboratories inmajorR&D locations ofAMMNCs, to employ highly qual-
iﬁed local personnel at these laboratories, and to set up organizational processes to handle patent
applications and internal knowledge distribution. From a national policy perspective, we ﬁnd that
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R&D locations in theUSandEurope are still technologically ahead. ChineseMNCs, andHuawei
in particular, however, are also capable of creating meaningful inventions that are strong enough
to be submitted to international patent oﬃces. Hence, for EMMNCs, it makes sense to access
knowledge abroad through R&D oﬀ-shoring, as it seems to be a path for successfully upgrading
R&D performance. AM have to face the fact that their local knowledge is increasingly attracting
EMMNCs that aim to incorporate it into their own knowledge stock.
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Abstract
Hiring experts in centers of state-of-the-art technology is an important way in which a multina-
tional enterprise (MNE) can gain competitive advantage, and yet use of this mechanism remains
under-researched. This study uses the case of a Chinese MNE that recently achieved a leading
position in the telecommunications market: Huawei Technologies. Taking the perspective of
Huawei’s oﬀshore hires, I ﬁnd that greenﬁeld investments contributed to overcoming liabilities
of origin and outsidership in the global telecommunications industry. Nevertheless, even now
that Huawei has caught up with industry incumbents, its output capabilities remain dependent
on the innovation capability of its oﬀshore experts.
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3.1 Introduction
Latecomer companies, especially those in knowledge-intensive and innovative industries, have be-
come more visible in the last decade through their global R&D activities (Awate et al., 2015; Di
Minin et al., 2012; Gammeltoft, 2008; Papanastassiou et al., 2019). To reduce the gap between
themselves and incumbents (Mathews, 2002; Mudambi, 2008), latecomers are increasingly in-
vesting in international centers of innovation as springboards to global competitiveness (Luo &
Tung, 2007). Although some latecomers have been able to build the capabilities needed to catch
up with (and even surpass) more established competitors (Luo & Zhang, 2016), we still do not
fully understand the mechanisms that allow them to gain a place among global players. A partic-
ularly promising, but as of yet under-researched mechanism, is the hiring of experts at oﬀshore
locations (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Song et al., 2003). I investigate how the establishment of for-
eign greenﬁeld R&D subsidiaries can be a low-proﬁle alternative to the better-researched catch-
up mechanism of acquiring foreign high-tech ﬁrms and also how the experts at those subsidiaries
can contribute to global competitiveness beyond providing access to knowledge. I carry out an
in-depth case study of the Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturer Huawei Tech-
nologiesCo. Ltd. (Huawei), which is known for strategically hiringR&Dexperts outside its home
country, earning it a reputation for intense knowledge sourcing. Huawei stands out because of the
rapiditywithwhich it caught upwith the industry leaders in telecommunications, surpassing them
in terms of annual revenue and patent applications at theWorld Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion (WIPO) (Lee et al., 2016). In fact, Huawei was a technological leader in China but had little
left to learn in its home country so it turned abroad to access state-of-the-art knowledge (Boutellier
et al., 2008; Fan, 2011). In order to hire senior experts, it set up R&D units close to competitors,
a strategy used previously by Korean MNEs (Lee & Lim, 2001). Huawei’s reliance on oﬀshore
hiring to catch up makes it an ideal subject for a case study exploring how hiring oﬀshore experts
can provide competitive advantages. 1 To identify the micro mechanisms of its catch-up process,
1The concept of oﬀshore experts has been discussed in the literature as "host country nationals" (HCN) mean-
ing persons working in their home country for a foreign company in contrast to expatriates who work abroad for
a company from their home country (Gong, 2003; Vance & Paik, 2005). I do not use the term because it does not
account for the diverse cultural backgrounds of experts working forMNEs andHuawei in particular (Caprar, 2011).
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I explicitly take the perspective of the oﬀshore experts in over 40 qualitative interviews at eight
diﬀerent R&D locations. I identiﬁed potential interviewees using an original Huawei patent and
scientiﬁc publication dataset, which I also used to analyze the timeline of Huawei’s global R&D
activities. I concentrated on the period leading up to Huawei’s global breakthrough to show how
the company achieved competitive advantage from a latecomer position. I contribute to the litera-
ture on R&D internationalization and entry modes by investigating mechanisms of a latecomer’s
greenﬁeld investments. Catching up by hiring goes beyond learning-by-hiring. To catch up, ﬁrms
must overcome liabilities of origin andof industry outsidership, and they cando thatwithoﬀshore
hires embedded both in the ﬁrm and in industry networks. I also uncover the strong connection
between Huawei’s output capabilities and the innovation capability of its oﬀshore experts.
3.2 Theoretical Background
3.2.1 Literature
I build on the Luo & Tung (2007, 2018) notion that outward foreign direct investment (FDI)
serves as a springboard for latecomer companies attempting to build competitive advantage and
overcome latecomer disadvantages. Jumping oﬀ the springboard allows latecomers to leverage
home-country competences and tomake use of new opportunities abroad at the same time, which
is in line with the dynamic capability argument (Grøgaard et al., 2019; Luo & Tung, 2007; Teece
et al., 1997). Competitive advantage can be built by combining already-existing advantages, such as
Huawei’s low labor costs and reputation for outstanding customer service, with new capabilities
like technical and innovative skills. Latecomer companies are under pressure to compete globally
while simultaneously defending their homemarket against established rivals (Hsu et al., 2015; Luo
& Tung, 2007). A common strategy for latecomers is to try to move from lower to higher value-
added activities in global value chains by acquiring state-of-the-art technology from incumbents
(Mathews, 2002;Mudambi, 2008), saving themselves the time it tookothers todevelop those tech-
nologies (Chen, 2004). Asian companies especially are known for strategically gaining expertise
from abroad (Child & Rodriguez, 2005; Poon et al., 2006). Earlier studies have looked at Korean
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and Taiwanese latecomers who caught up in the 1970s, Samsung and LG Electronics for example
(Cho et al., 1998; Lee & Lim, 2001; Miao et al., 2018). I analyze a company from China as a more
recently emerging economy, and speciﬁcally focus on its "emerging phase" in an eﬀort to detect
capabilities that latecomers need in order to create competitive advantage (Hernandez & Guil-
lén, 2018). Global incumbents beneﬁt from international networks that have historically evolved
(Meyer et al., 2011), latecomers on the other hand need to ﬁnd ways to enter these despite their
lack of connections and global industry embeddedness (Cantwell &Mudambi, 2011; Johanson &
Vahlne, 2009). I propose that one strategy that can help overcome such restrictions is to leverage
the inherent embeddedness of locations where employees, companies and stakeholders are already
integrated in global industry networks. Here, the oﬀshore expert dual embeddedness can provide
the ﬁrm that hires themwith not only an entrée into the local context, butmore importantly away
into the global industry network. Latecomers may also suﬀer from liabilities of origin. Emerging
market ﬁrms in particular often have to contend with stereotypes that stem from the behavior
of other home-country actors, including other ﬁrms and governments (Asmussen, 2009; Fiaschi
et al., 2017). Being an industry outsider fromChina added toHuawei’s struggle to enter the global
telecommunications industry. Not only industry incumbents attempted to block it, but some
Western governments such as theUSdid as well. Given the additional obstacles it faced, the ques-
tion is howHuaweimanaged to become a global technology leader. According to the springboard
perspective, the acquisition of foreign ﬁrms is themainmeans of accessing state-of-the-art knowl-
edge (Luo&Tung, 2007), but there has been recent calls in the literature to shift the focus onother
investment modes such as greenﬁeld investments (Kumar et al., 2019; Luo & Tung, 2018). Many
scholars have assumed that acquisitions aremade to obtain strategic assets such as technology and
brands and that they can oﬀer fast access to the business network of an acquired ﬁrm, while green-
ﬁeld investments, which entail building facilities from scratch, have thus far beenmainly ascribed
to market-seeking motives (Anderson & Sutherland, 2015; Rui & Yip, 2008; Klossek et al., 2012).
In this regard, Huawei is an atypical case as it pursues knowledge-seeking strategies through the
establishment of greenﬁeldR&D subsidiaries, thus the analysis contributes to closing a gap in our
understanding of mechanisms of greenﬁeld investments in knowledge-seeking R&D internation-
alization (Anderson & Sutherland, 2015). Instead of acquiring ﬁrms for their knowledge, Huawei
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hires oﬀshore experts, who are experienced technical experts from technologically advanced com-
petitors or research institutions atHuawei’s oﬀshore locations, in order to tap their experience and
technical know-how. The extant literature recognizes the hiring of oﬀshore experts as a way to
obtain state-of-the-art knowledge; ergo, learning-by-hiring (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Song et al.,
2003).Those experts have tacit and complex knowledge that is not easily codiﬁable, which can
be used to build up the company’s knowledge stock (Argote & Ingram, 2000). Incumbents on
the other hand are eager to preserve their competitiveness and attempt to reduce the inter-ﬁrm
mobility of highly qualiﬁed employees through non-compete contracts and the threat of patent
litigations (Campbell et al., 2012;Ganco et al., 2015). In order to better understand the value of oﬀ-
shore experts forHuawei, in this study I donot, as somehave, focus solely on learningmechanisms,
but adopt a broader perspective, analyzing the eclectic role of experts in creating competitive ad-
vantage. I achieved this by conducting interviews using an exploratory approach leveraging the
experts’ point of view in order to allow for new insights into catching up by hiring. I was able thus
to go beyond learning-by-hiring and show how oﬀshore experts improveHuawei’s embeddedness
in global telecommunications industry networks.
3.2.2 Context and development
WhenHuawei was founded in the late 1980s, global players fromWestern countries such as Eric-
sson, Siemens, Nokia, Motorola, Alcatel, Nortel and Lucent dominated the telecommunications
industry. In the early 2000s the bursting of the IT bubble started a wave of consolidations that
created Alcatel-Lucent and Nokia-Siemens-Networks, and eventually led to Nortel’s bankruptcy
in 2009 (Lee et al., 2016). This was an important factor in the development of Huawei, China’s
own telecommunications market was another. When the Deng Xiaoping Open Door Policy be-
gan in 1984, Chinese telecommunications technology lagged behind that of the West by some
20 years. By the time Huawei was founded, there was huge pent up demand especially in rural
areas (Mu & Lee, 2005). It ﬁrst sold cheaper low-end telecommunications infrastructure equip-
ment in the countrysidewhich allowed it to avoid head-to-head competitionwithmore technolog-
ically advanced foreign competitors which were concentrating instead on large urban areas (Lee
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et al., 2016; Li & Cheong, 2016). Once its domestic market reached a certain degree of saturation,
Huawei expanded sales to other emerging markets, India and Russia, and a number of countries
in Africa and Latin America (Lee et al., 2016;Micheli & Carrillo, 2016). Leveraging its low prices,
familiaritywith rapidly changingpolitical conditions, and thepolitical ties between its homecoun-
try and host countries, Huawei’s strategy was to become big by ﬁrst winning emerging markets
(Cooke, 2012; Li & Cheong, 2016; Micheli & Carrillo, 2016). Again Huawei avoided direct com-
petition with global players while it built expertise and grew. The next step was to tackle the low
quality of its products. In the mid-2000s it started to expand its R&D activities to global innova-
tion centers outside China. Today, Huawei does its most impactful R&D oﬀshore, as shown by
the fact that its higher quality patents are created by its oﬀshore in contrast to domestic employ-
ees (Schaefer & Liefner, 2017). Geographic, cultural and institutional distance had little impact
on the sequence ofHuawei’s R&D investments, as the company enteredWestern technology cen-
ters such as Silicon Valley early on (Fan, 2011). Huawei’s disregard for cultural and institutional
distance was a result of the company following the location choice of global industry leaders, but
proved a major hurdle for the company for gaining legitimacy. Still now, Huawei’s strategy prior-
itizes internal innovations over acquired ones thus it locates close to competitors in order to hire
technological experts (Chang et al., 2017). Cooke (2012) observes that Huawei’s oﬀshore sub-
sidiaries usually start out with a small team of Chinese expatriates who then hire local employees.
Huawei also upgraded its technological capability through strategic foreign R&D cooperation,
for example it formed alliances withTexas Instruments, Sun and Intel (Lee et al., 2016), and in the
early phase of internationalization pursued fast and unidirectional knowledge absorption from
university collaborations (Liefner et al., 2019). As a privately owned ﬁrm, Huawei did not receive
ﬁnancial incentives from the China Development Bank as did its state-owned competitors. This
did not change until the mid-2000s when the Chinese government helped it in its eﬀorts to in-
ternationalize as part of the Going Global Policy. That support enabled the company to expand
its sales to established markets, which it again did by initially selling products at very low prices in
order to build a customer base (Cooke, 2012;Micheli &Carrillo, 2016;Nolan, 2014). Unlike its ex-
perience in emergingmarkets, in theWest Huawei came up against a hostile political climate, the
US even accusingHuawei of espionage, an accusation some see as directed at the Chinese govern-
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ment (Cooke, 2012; Chung &Mascitelli, 2015). Just as it had stymied state-owned Chinese com-
panies previously, theUS government stood in theway ofHuaweimaking acquisitions and barred
it from bidding for national network projects, causing Huawei to focus on European, Canadian
and Australian markets (Anderson & Sutherland, 2015; Chung &Mascitelli, 2015; Nolan, 2014).
Despite these roadblocks, by 2008Huawei became the number one patent applicant atWIPOand
in 2012 surpassed industry leader Ericsson in annual revenue (Lee et al., 2016). Huawei was a late
entrant in the standardization process for the fourth generation of wireless systems (4G), but it
became amain contributor to the ﬁfth (5G).Whenmaking generalizations fromcase studies, one
needs to take into account its speciﬁcities (Brinkmann&Kvale, 2018; Yin, 2014). InHuawei’s case
this includes government-provided advantages (Gaur et al., 2018) such as access to cheap capital
which allows the company to take greater risks, a bad reputation in theWest, even in comparison
to other Chinese companies, and geopolitical risk, as the latest developments in the trade dispute
between the US and China demonstrate.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Research Design
To answer "how" using the amongChineseMNEs uncommon strategy of hiring oﬀshore experts
instead of acquisitions helpsHuawei to create competitive advantage on a global scale, a case study
design was deemedmost appropriate because of the high complexity of the phenomenon (Birkin-
shaw et al., 2011; Ghauri, 2004; Marschan-Piekkari & Welch, 2004; Yin, 2014). This research
design makes it possible to unfold interrelated and consecutive processes, for instance experts at
oﬀshore locations using their contacts to approach further potential employees, which starts a
self-reinforcing spiral that helps the business unit and its network to grow. Previous research has
identiﬁed a lack of qualitative studies when it comes to knowledge-seeking subsidiaries, leading to
a lack of in-depth understanding of the phenomen (Michailova & Mustaﬀa, 2012). (Doz, 2011,
p. 587) argues that a qualitative study can make a crucial contribution as it "allows a conceptual-
ization from the standpoint of the actors at work". The research design I adopted for this case
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study allows me to tap into the perspective of oﬀshore experts, in order to uncover their role in
the company’s catch up. In order to capture variations between locations, I interviewed experts at
Huawei’s major patent-or scientiﬁc publication-producing oﬀshore R&D labs (Birkinshaw et al.,
2011), hence the R&D subsidiaries form the meso-level of analysis. The aggregated level of analy-
sis is the company itself, and the goal is the big picture, Huawei’s R&D internationalization. The
case is embedded in the context of the global telecommunications industry, as the interviewees
all have profound knowledge of the industry and are able to situate their experience within the
context of the industry, providing both an insider’s and an outsider’s perspective on the company.
Thismeans that the study has features of an embedded case studymethod aswell as amultiple case
study design (Yin, 2014). Some interviewees were current Huawei employee, others former ones.
Another feature of the study design intended to ensure critical distance from the company is that
I did not ask managers about their aims, but instead asked engineers about their practical tasks.
This provided a check on the kind of one-sided company-created narratives Tokatli (2015) warns
are the ’dark side’ of ﬁrm-centric case studies. In line with this, I adopted an exploratory approach
withmainly inductive category building to stay open to new interpretations of the oﬀshore expert
role in generating competitive advantages (Doz, 2011; Flick, 2018).
3.3.2 Data and Analysis
The main ﬁndings of my qualitative analysis are drawn from semi-structured interviews. I identi-
ﬁedpotential interviewees andobtain a broader picture of the company’sR&Dactivity using three
databases, PatentsView for data from theUnitedStates Patent andTrademarkOﬃce (USPTO),
PATSTAT for the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO), and Elsevier’s Scopus for publication data.
The experts I selected to ask for an interview were either at the time or previously employed at an
oﬀshore location of Huawei Technologies or at Huawei Device, Futurewei or HiSilicon, Huawei
subsidiaries. As the inventors listed on patent applications ﬁled by Huawei are not necessarily
employed by Huawei (Ge et al., 2016), I used online social media platforms such as LinkedIn and
ResearchGate to investigate which experts were, or had been, employed by the company. There is
a clear break point in the number of patents and scientiﬁc publications per location, eight of them
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being far and away the most active: Munich, Stockholm, Dallas, San Jose, San Diego, Bridgewa-
ter, Chicago andOttawa. Together they account formore than 90% ofHuawei’s oﬀshore patents
ﬁled with the USPTO and 88% with the EPO, as well as 73% of all oﬀshore scientiﬁc publication
activity. I contacted 233 inventors using LinkedIn and e-mail and was able to do 42 interviews. I
carried out interviews between February and September 2017, some in person, others via Skype
or telephone, in one case I conducted a follow up interview. I decided against inclusion in the
analysis of one interview simply for lack of usable information. Twenty-four of the remaining
40 interviewees were located in the US and Canada, 14 others in Europe. Two interviewees did
not have a ﬁxed location. The majority of interviewees were oﬀshore experts, that is, they were
experienced technical experts whom Huawei hired from technologically advanced competitors
or research institutions outside of China and two interviewees were Chinese expats, educated in
China and previously employed by Huawei China. In addition to their professional experience,
all of the oﬀshore experts had a tertiary education at one of the universities located in Western
hotspots of the global telecommunications industry. Four of the interviewees had a Chinese uni-
versity undergraduate education before getting a higher degree or taking an academic position
abroad. These interviewees were able to provide a cultural insider’s perspective. Many of those
interviewed in the US and in Canada were from India or a country in South America, theMiddle
East, North Africa or East Europe, but all of them had had some education in North America
or had worked there before Huawei hired them. Those interviewed in Europe were mostly from
within Europe. The interviewees without exception were males. This is reﬂective of the indus-
try as I was able to identify less than 0.1% females among the oﬀshore inventors and none agreed
to an interview. Finally, across the board, former employees were more open to sharing insights
than current ones, the latter were also reluctant to share negative experiences. Themain questions
posed in the semi-structured interviews are provided in the appendix. There are three blocks of
questions, the ﬁrst about previous employment, coming to work at Huawei, and the particular
lab joined, the second about external contacts and inﬂuence, and the third about their tasks and
role within Huawei. The professional background responses provide information about the kind
of knowledge and contacts Huawei is able to access abroad. Responses to the second set of ques-
tions provide information about the extent of external contacts and how they might be used, as
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well as the possibility of external barriers to Huawei’s operations. Finally, responses to questions
about tasks and work partners within the company throw light on the internal role of experts.
I employed qualitative analysis software using MaxQDA. Coding the text helped me to identify
general patterns as well as complex interrelationships. The main codes follow the guidelines of
the semi-structured interviews and therefore are based on theoretical considerations. All of the
sublevel categories evolve from open coding, using an exploratory research approach to generate
ﬁndings from the micro-level (Gibbs, 2018). I compared the interviewees’ responses using cross
tables that split thematerial along variables used to process background information on the inter-
viewees. Table 3.1 shows the interviewee variables by theme and the number of interviewees per
category. This is not intended to quantify the qualitative data or imply that the interviews can be
weighed in anyway against one another, but to give a more transparent overview of the material.
Table 3.1: Interviewee variables
Name of thematic set Variables Number of
interviewees
Location:
city-level
Dallas / San Jose / San Diego / Bridgewater /
Chicago / Ottawa
24
Munich / Stockholm 14
Undeﬁned 2
Location: regional-level USA / Canada 26Europe 14
Employment status Current 16Former 24
Employment length
<4 Years 16
4 – 7 Years 15
>7 Years 9
Former employer
Academia 12
Competitor 26
Huawei China 2
Cultural background Chinese 6Non-Chinese 34
Position
R&D 35
Management 2
Sales 3
Huawei’s R&D internationalization
phase during employment
(not disjoint)
Early activities ( <2009) 15
Rapid expansion (2009 – 2013) 34
Take-over ( >2013) 22
To preserve conﬁdentiality, I coded thematerial alone in two iterations at diﬀerent points in time
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in order to bolster coding reliability and to ensure analysis quality. I shared my ﬁndings with one
of the interviewees who I found had provided exceptionally broad insights and used his feedback
to critically review the results (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2018). A limitation of the data is that it only
shows the parts of Huawei’s R&D that resulted in patents and scientiﬁc publications. Neverthe-
less, Huawei is known to encourage patenting and strongly incentivizes employees to do so. This
is why the data is a good proxy for the company’s R&D activity in Western markets. Another
limitation is that the perspective of oﬀshore experts does not reﬂect the intentions of the com-
pany’s management. This means that it is diﬃcult to know if management decisions were made
deliberately or in response to circumstances. Further, a review of print media on the topics of
Huawei appointing foreign retired oﬃcials and politicians to local boards and hiring lobbyists
shows its eﬀorts to obtain political expertise. I searched Google News under "Huawei" with key
words "lobby*", "board", "board member*", "hire/hiring", and "oﬃcial*". Table 3.2 in the appendix
gives an overview of 17 articles appearing between 2010 and 2015 in Australia, the UK and theUS.
3.4 Results and Discussion
3.4.1 Huawei’s oﬀshore R&D in the global context
Thepublicly available data onHuawei’s oﬀshoreR&Dis neither detailednor consistent, therefore
I use patent and scientiﬁc publication data to track the company’s activity. Figure 3.1 provides
an overview of activity at Huawei’s main oﬀshore locations. Diﬀerences in patent regulations
between theUSPTOand the EPOmake it impossible to compare directly the number of patents
ﬁled between them, although I am able to illustrate in the ﬁgure Huawei’s intense R&D output,
especially in theUS, which is remarkable given that the company has very few sales in thatmarket.
The interviews make clear that Huawei’s R&D location choices abroad often followed the loca-
tion of competitors. The downsizing of a rival could mean an opportunity for Huawei to hire
experts without running into non-compete agreement problems. The company targeted Ericsson
experts and set up its own facilities in Stockholm and San Diego when the Swedish ﬁrm down-
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Fig. 3.1: R&D output of Huawei’s oﬀshore locations
sized in those cities. Huawei also appears to have been motivated by the bankruptcy of Nortel
to open a facility in Ottawa where it was able to hire entire teams that lost their jobs. Moreover,
following the location of competitors provides access to established infrastructure for a particular
technology at a given location, such as university departments focusing on technology in which
Huawei was interested in the case of Ottawa and Munich. In San Diego and Dallas Huawei was
able to tap into supplier and customer networks. Hiring from competitors is not uncommon in
the industry, but interviewees emphasized the extent to whichHuawei used them was unusual. In
some cases Huawei located oﬃces only meters from competitors. That was seen by some in the
industry as being aggressive, but many employees welcomed the job option atHuawei after losing
their previous job. Depending on the shortage of local alternatives, such as in Ottawa compared
to themany opportunities in San Jose, many of them did not have to relocate because of the job at
Huawei. This is not to say that all experts were "pushed" to work for Huawei. Huawei was oﬀer-
ing higher salaries and a range of perks including more professional freedom. Each of Huawei’s
oﬀshore labs specializes in a diﬀerent portfolio of technologies. As it follows the competition,
those portfolios are driven by the focus of competitors and by extension by the key personnel
Huawei might be able to hire. In other words, Huawei’s oﬀshore experts inﬂuence the company’s
local specialization. For example, in Dallas the primary focus is on telecommunications, whereas
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in SiliconValley it is on internet products. Likewise, in some locations there is more cooperation
with universities than in others that tend, for instance, to concentrate onwork in standardization.
Figure 3.2 distinguishes between three diﬀerent phases inHuawei oﬀshore R&D output, starting
with the ﬁrst from the Stockholm lab in 2004 followed by smaller labs in Dallas, San Jose and
San Diego in 2006. Interviewees from Stockholm explained that Huawei started there under the
name Atelier Telecom to avoid attracting attention; it was renamed Huawei in 2004. The oldest
locations in the US are Dallas, San Diego and some minor activities in Silicon Valley. Between
2009 and 2013, Huawei started to expand its oﬀshore R&Dmore rapidly and, early in this phase,
major locations in Munich, Chicago, Bridgewater and Ottawa started generating output. In ad-
dition, Huawei’s labs in Silicon Valley became more active around 2011. After Huawei overtook
its competitors in terms of revenue in 2014 (the take-over phase in Figure 3.2), there was another
surge in output, but fewer new locations. This coincides with heavy recruiting by Huawei to take
advantage of some industry incumbents cutting back as the fourth generation of wireless systems
(4G) was at the end of its technological life cycle and the ﬁfth (5G) not yet ready for the market.
Fig. 3.2: Development of Huawei’s oﬀshore R&D
Very early in its R&D internationalization process, Huawei emphasized patenting to increase its
portfolio and improve its position in negotiations for license fees. The company ﬁled a tremen-
dousnumberof them, primarily to signal technological competence. RecentlyHuawei has changed
60
Chapter 3
course, not concentrating on their quantity, but ﬁling patents for high-quality ones.
3.4.2 The role of oﬀshore experts
The role of the oﬀshore experts during Huawei’s entrée in the global industry fall into ﬁve cate-
gories: contacts, perceptions of reliability&reputation, experience, technical knowledge and lan-
guage. The ﬁrst two of the ﬁve are related to embeddedness while the latter three correspond
to skills. Table 3.3 in the appendix provides a detailed overview, while Figure 3.3 gives an overall
picture.
Fig. 3.3: The role of oﬀshore experts in Huawei’s catch up
Hiring embedded oﬀshore experts contributed to overcome the vicious circle of barriers, such as
lack of skills, reputation and contacts, that blocked it from competing in the industry and con-
tributed to reverse this process. 2 Figure 3.3 shows how hiring those experts started a recurrent
process, similar to the upward spiral of the springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 2018), that
gradually helped Huawei to improve its position in the global telecommunications industry. The
ﬁgure displays the dual embeddedness of the oﬀshore hires by visually embedding them into the
context ofHuawei at the same time as in the context of the established global telecommunications
industry. The two arrows represent Huawei’s access to qualiﬁed employees, customers, universi-
ties, research projects and standardization organizations: One is interrupted by barriers, such as
2Hiring technical oﬀshore experts is a powerful means Huawei used to enter the global industry, but not the
only one. It also used technical and managerial consultancy, political lobbying, and participation in prestigious R&D
cooperation projects.
61
Chapter 3
a negative image, exclusion and government restrictions, symbolizing the diﬃculties of gaining
access; the other arrow shows how oﬀshore experts helped to overcome these barriers with their
skills and embeddedness. The dynamic of the model is shown by the arrows that build upon each
other and bounce back and forth betweenHuawei and its oﬀshore experts and the industry, in a re-
current process of greater that facilitates more and more access with every iteration. For example
hiring highly skilled employees provides state-of-the-art knowledge used to create new technol-
ogy, which can be patented and become part of standards, and thus improve Huawei’s reputation
and attractiveness for potential new highly skilled employees. Therefore, the need to bridge dis-
advantages through oﬀshore experts decreases over time as the company builds its own network
and reputation abroad, catches up on technical skills, and gains more global experience. Over-
all, Huawei seeks technology as well as legitimacy by hiring skilled and embedded experts abroad.
Even if most oﬀshore experts fulﬁll both roles, it makes sense to distinguish between these two
hiring motivations.
3.4.3 The role of skills
Huawei hires senior experts with experience in the industry or with doctoral degrees from foreign
universities. The company is unusual in that it does not provide skills development opportuni-
ties for experts outside of China, which is unusual, compared to other employers. In contrast,
Huawei hires at home mostly young university graduates, who are described as very smart but
still inexperienced by some of the interviewees. Oﬀshore experts are implicitly tasked to share
their experience with young hires as they work on joint projects, for instance attending together
standardization meetings during which those with more experience might tutor those with little
on how to negotiate successfully. However, oﬀshore experts, from Canada and the US in par-
ticular, emphasized that they are not allowed to share restricted technologies, for instance those
withmilitary relevance, with their Chinese colleagues. I list in Table 3.2 printmedia about foreign
retired oﬃcials and politicians working for or with Huawei. The company seeks political exper-
tise about hostmarkets, in particular for itsmarket-seeking oﬀshore activities inAustralia and the
UK,mostly from individuals who have a background in the areas of trade and investment, IT tech-
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nology, foreign or domestic policy, and defense or cyber-security. They have helped Huawei with
strategic issues and with bidding for government contracts. In a similar way, technical oﬀshore
experts have used the skills they have honed through longstanding experience in the industry to
helpHuawei’s catch up by facilitating the company’s participation in standardization committees
and in EU-ﬁnanced research projects. In short, Huawei has been able to make use of its experts’
knowledge about informal industry policies and customers technological requirements. Oﬀshore
experts have also helped make up for a lack of English ﬂuency, which is an industry requirement
that many Chinese engineers cannot meet in spite of English being the oﬃcial language of the
company. Oﬀshore experts have also brought to bear their technical knowledge, by which I mean
the kind of knowledge gained through university education, to generate patents, and state-of-the-
art technical solutions for customers, represent the company at conferences, and contribute to
industry standard-setting committees. Each of these was important in bridging the knowledge
gap between Huawei’s domestic R&D and that of global industry competitors. Nonetheless, in-
terviewees report that while that gap is rapidly closing, Huawei remains behind when it comes to
innovative skills. Thus, one of the main tasks for oﬀshore employees is to create novel product
ideas—ones that can be developed and produced by a larger and less costly workforce in China.
Locating themorework-intensive task of development inChina not only saves costs but allows for
better alignment of development and production. Such division of tasks enables Huawei to make
better use of its competitive advantage, but on the negative side, it exposes the company to knowl-
edge spillovers, loss of information in the transfer process, and political risk in host countries.
Putting these ﬁndings in the context of the literature, the interviews conﬁrm that leveraging the
experience and the product knowledge that oﬀshore experts gained while working for top com-
petitors enables Huawei to produce state-of-the-art products without having to ﬁrst learn how
to create them itself. The extant literature holds that while companies can gain output capabili-
ties by acquiring technologies directly related to a speciﬁc product, experience and knowledge of
the overall technology is needed for innovation capabilities (Awate et al., 2012).Singh & Agrawal
(2011) also challenge the idea of learning-by-hiring, as they ﬁnd that companies use their newly
hired employees’ knowledge directly instead of integrating it. At the same time, it may be more
attractive for ﬁrms to invest in output capabilities in the early stages of internationalization be-
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cause that is likely to provide quicker returns than the longer termprocess of acquiring innovation
capabilities by integrating the knowledge of experts. Huawei relies on the innovative ideas of its
foreign experts and uses them to bridge its own lack of innovation capabilities.
Proposition 1: Hiring experienced and knowledgeable oﬀshore experts can be a means of directly
accessing the innovative input needed for developing state-of-the-art products—even before the
rest of the company has caught up on innovation capability.
3.4.4 The role of embeddedness
Being an industry outsider initiallymade it diﬃcult forHuawei to hire the best people, but became
easier over time as the company became better known and increasingly embedded. One strat-
egy used to overcome the diﬃculty of hiring key people was to oﬀer them greater professional
freedom, including allowing them to build their own teams, which they often did by recruiting
former colleagues. In that way Huawei gained accessed to experts and other experts known to
them. Huawei oﬀered other strong incentives as well like lucrative bonuses and exceptionally
high salaries—in some cases doubling what had been earned before. Interviewees reported that
such beneﬁts had to be weighed against long-term jobmarket prospects being harmed by working
for Huawei as its reputation in the global industry was one of technological backwardness and
lacking reliability. There were also push factors, for instance the earlier mentioned experts who
hadworked forNortel inOttawa or Ericsson in Stockholmhad few good alternative employment
options if they wanted to stay where they were. Huawei beneﬁted not only from the contacts of
former colleagues of their oﬀshore experts, but fromtheir strategic contactswithin the industry at
large as they served as door openers to customers and to suppliers, such as AT&T andQualcomm,
and to research collaboration with prestigious universities. Some interviewees reported that this
was only partially successful as some of their contacts became unusable when they joinedHuawei,
as former colleagues tended to see the company as unreliable. Huawei tried to improve its image
by bringing on board highly-respected ﬁgures in the industry in order to signal that the company
was technologically competent to customers and in standardization (seeTable 3.3). Moreover, the
oﬀshore experts’ higher cultural proximity in comparison to their Chinese colleagues improved
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Huawei’s reliability in the eyes ofWestern business and research partners. Huawei appointed ex-
military oﬃcers, former heads of industry, and retiredUK andAustralian government oﬃcials to
be non-executive directors of the local boards of its foreign subsidiaries (See Appendix Table 3.2).
The articles reveal that Huawei wanted the appointees both to advise Huawei’s management and
to improve the way inwhich the companywas seen. Huawei also hired lobbyists inWashington in
an attempt to change the image of the company amongUS politicians, an eﬀort that appears not
to have been successful. The analysis of the interviews uncovers that the oﬀshore experts believe
that a main barrier for Huawei is its lack of legitimacy among global industry stakeholders. Prior
research has shown that negative impressions can in part be due to cultural and institutional dis-
tance such as that between China and theWest. In the case of Chinese companies this seems to
stem fromallegations of excessive government inﬂuence on companies (Child&Rodriguez, 2005;
He&Lyles, 2008; Si &Liefner, 2014). Western host countries often depend on producing sophis-
ticated technology for the world market and are concerned about losing critical technologies, in
some cases even of military relevance, to foreign competitors (Meyer et al., 2014). The Chinese
military career of founderRenZhengfei compounds the problemas the principalHuawei product
is telecommunication infrastructure which is particularly vulnerable to foreign intelligence. For
these reasons, Chinese attempts to make investments in theWest are often received with skepti-
cism if not with outright hostility (Buckley et al., 2018). The US government has from early on
blockedHuawei’s acquisition ofUS companies, claiming national security reasons. In addition to
placing former politicians and other nationally-known ﬁgures on subsidiary boards, Huawei has
tried to overcome liabilities of origin by making greenﬁeld investments rather than acquisitions.
3 Host countries tend to see greenﬁelds as less invasive than acquisitions andmore legitimate, and
because the investor public proﬁle is also lower they are less likely to attractmedia attention (Buck-
ley et al., 2018;Meyer et al., 2014). Greenﬁelds not only helpHuawei avoid a number of issues, but
they even boost its image through the positive reputation and connections of its oﬀshore experts.
Proposition 2: Greenﬁeld R&D investments where oﬀshore experts are given a predominant role
3There are particular factors and conditions that made a greenﬁeld approach attractive for Huawei. and this
may limit generalizability to other latecomers, the sensitivity of the telecommunications industry, Huawei’s access to
cheap credit, and an economic downturn to name a few.
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can help latecomers in sensitive industries gain legitimacy abroad. Moreover, they can signal tech-
nological competence and improve ﬁrm reputation.
3.4.5 The scope of oﬀshore experts
Huawei went abroad to gain knowledge of the global telecommunications industry because the
most powerful players are currently located in the West. Experts in gateway locations are well
embedded in a worldwide industry community by participation in cross-border networking and
through international standardization and research projects, but they are not very mobile on a
global scale. Huawei is not able to hire them in China so it set up R&D labs abroad to leverage
their dual embeddedness that provides access to the local context and the global industry network
at the same time. In some cases,Huawei hires key experts with extensive international connections
even though they are based in areas remote from its existing oﬀshoreR&D labs. Huawei also hires
experts recently arrived in locations where it has a lab even though they are originally from far
away. Another example for the expert’s scope isHuawei’s EuropeanR&Dcenter inMunichwhere
many employees come from outside Germany and make regular use of their industry contacts
back in their home countries. All in all this shows that Huawei hires experts not only for their
local connections and reputation as discussed in the literature (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009), but
also for their global impact.
Proposition 3: Oﬀshore experts may not be hired solely for their embeddedness in local industry
networks, but also for their embeddedness in global industry networks that would otherwise be
inaccessible to latecomers.
3.5 Conclusion
Conditions were favorable for entering the global telecommunications industry using a catching-
up-by-hiring strategy at the time Huawei was setting up R&D facilities abroad. Lee & Malerba
(2017) explain that the catch-up cycles of industries have a repetitive temporal pattern of emerg-
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ing windows of opportunity that allow latecomers to achieve industry leadership. Huawei ben-
eﬁted from a cooling down phase in the technological life cycle that led to competitors down-
sizing, hence more industry experts were on the job market. Some of them coming to work for
Huawei helped it enter the industry. Rather than attempting to make acquisitions that would
provide fast access to markets through existing brands, Huawei used greenﬁeld investments to
gain inﬂuence with its own brand (Anderson & Sutherland, 2015). Moreover, the company was
able to generate dynamic capabilities by combining its already existing advantages of access to
cheap capital, low labor costs at home, and a reputation for providing customer-centric service,
with newly-acquired technical and innovation capabilities provided by oﬀshore hires. The per-
spective of the oﬀshore experts provides a more disaggregated picture than found in the many
studies that rely mainly onmanagement accounts. Indeed, aggregating the perspectives of experts
and locations allows unvarnished insights from behind the curtain of the corporate image, such
as that working for Huawei was initially considered harmful for the careers of some experts and
caused partial loss of their networks. In addition to showcasing a diﬀerent perspective, I consider
a less-investigated means of internationalizing. Future research should not only look at formal
acquisitions when studying catch-up strategies, but look deeper into hiring practices of greenﬁeld
investments as this study shows that they are not only undertaken to serve foreign markets. One
contribution of this study is that it shows that latecomers in highly globalized industries may also
be able to proﬁt from hiring non-locals who are culturally and professionally embedded in the in-
ternational industry networks, thus providing entry points to latecomer ﬁrms seeking to become
internationally embedded in an industry. There are some limits to the generalizability of this
study asHuawei is a rather special latecomer in terms of the particular timing of its international-
ization, its access to cheap domestic capital, its negative image abroad, and the politically sensitive
nature of its telecommunication infrastructure business. Nonetheless, this case provides valuable
insights into themechanism of hiring as part of a catch-up process. Themanagement implication
is that hiring experts at locations of strategic global importance can be a way to accelerate eﬀorts
to catch up with industry leaders under certain circumstances. This approach, in contrast to ac-
quisitions, might help latecomers gain legitimization in host countries. The policy implications
of the ﬁndings for Western decision makers are that latecomer companies can absorb displaced
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experts during market downturns, although more research is needed on the sustainability of such
jobs. Finally, one long-term implication for Huawei is that it might want to concentrate its most
innovativeR&Dactivities inChina to reduce political risk and spillovers aswell as the information
losses inherent in transferring research output over long distances. The current political situation
in the US in particular shows how vulnerable Huawei’s current approach leaves it. The question
remains of whether Huawei will manage to catch up in terms of innovation capability at its main
ChineseR&D locations and become independent from its oﬀshore experts’ inventive capabilities.
In such a scenario, it might then suﬃce to have just a few overseas locations as listening posts for
cooperation and technology monitoring, in particular in host countries where it faces political
risk.
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Table 3.2: Print media on Huawei hiring oﬃcials abroad
Title Date of
publication
Author Newspaper /
publisher
Former US oﬃcial joins Huawei
consultancy
21.10.2010 Stephanie
Kirchgaessner
Financial Times
Huawei names John Brumby, Alexander
Downer board members
06.06.2011 Michael Sainsbury The Australian
Downer joins the board of Chinese telco 06.06.2011 Lucy Battersby The Sydney
Morning Herald
Downer, Brumby join Huawei Australia
board
06.06.2011 James Hutchinson iTnews
Government’s former IT boss inMI6
grilling after taking job with Chinese
mobile giant
07.08.2011 Abul Taher Daily Mail
Row over Chinese role for British trade
chief three months after £1.2m pay oﬀ
13.11.2011 Valerie Elliot Daily Mail
Huawei’s Downer warns on Chinese
paranoia
18.04.2012 James Hutchinson CRN
Huawei hires former U.S. defense
contractor oﬃcial
10.07.2012 Ellen Nakashima TheWashington
Post
Huawei expands lobbying amid national
security probe by Congress
26.08.2012 Eric Engleman /
Jonathan D. Salant
TheWashington
Post
Huawei’s Australian directors get two
more years in job
24.08.2013 Peter Cai The Sydney
Morning Herald
Admiral goes in to bat for Huawei 27.10.2012 Peter Cai / Lucy
Battersby
The Sydney
Morning Herald
Conservatives and Lib Dems take
donations from Chinese company
accused of US security threat
20.11.2012 RowenaMason The Telegraph
Chinese ﬁrmHuawei spends tens of
thousands lobbying British politicians
30.11.2012 Christopher Hope The Telegraph
Questions grow on U.S. lobbyists with
strong ties to Chinese ﬁrm linked to
espionage worries
26.04.2013 Richard Pollock TheWashington
Examiner
It’s the biggest company that no one has
heard of
27.04.2013 Adele Ferguson /
Peter Cai
The Sydney
Morning Herald
Lord Browne to head Huawei’s UK
board
16.02.2015 Daniel Thomas Financial Times
Huawei appoints three non-executive
directors to UK board
16.02.2015 PaulWithers Mobile News
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Table 3.3: Cross table on relationship between skills and experience
Industry
standards
Particularly
important in
telecommunica-
tions, high
license fees are
demanded to
use standards,
increases
inﬂuence and
signals
technological
competence
EU-ﬁnanced
projects
Helps to
capture
technology,
boosts
reputation,
provides
contacts in the
industry, early
attempts to
participate fail
for lack of
embeddedness
University
cooperation
Cooperating
with prestigious
ones signals
competence
and improves
global image,
technology
transfer is not
necessarily the
main goal
Customers &
suppliers
Needed to
operate in the
global industry,
improving
perceptions of
reliability is
easier through
existing
contacts
Qualiﬁed
employees
Initially
diﬃcult to hire
because Huawei
is unknown /
has a negative
reputation in
the industry
Contacts Important for
negotiations
and keeping
up-to-date on
industry
politics
Contacts in the
projects help
getting
accepted
Contacts from
academia used
to set up
cooperations
Contacts to
customers of
former
employer
Recruiting
former
colleagues to
work in the
team
Perceptions
of reliability
& reputation
Helps in
negotiations
and for getting
inﬂuential
positions in
standards
Hiring
European
engineers and
cooperating
with European
universities
generates
perceived
reliability
Hiring experts
from academia
improves
perceptions of
reliability
Western
experts are sent
to client
meetings to
signal
technological
competence
Experience Helps to
negotiate and
interpret
politics between
stakeholders
Project
experience
helps to apply
for and succeed
in projects
Knowledge of
the ﬁeld helps
to choose the
right
cooperation
partners
Understanding
of western
customer’s
wishes
Technological
knowledge
Understanding
of
state-of-the-art
technology
enables
contribution
How to make
the products ﬁt
the customers’
needs and how
to create
state-of-the-art
solutions
Language Bridging
English
language barrier
for Chinese
engineers to
facilitate active
participation
Local R&D
takes over
projects from
headquarters to
bridge language
barriers
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Give us ideas! - Splitting research and
development to bridge lack of innovativeness
Authors: Kerstin J. Schäfer, Stefan Hennemann, Ingo Liefner
Status: Major Revision December 2019 at Journal of Economic Geography
Abstract
Recently, established centers of state-of-the-art technologynotably experience increasingknowledge-
intensive activities byEmerging-marketmultinational enterprises (EMNEs). This reﬂectsEMNEs’
quest to upgrade technological capability in order to compete with global players. We study those
upgrading mechanisms employing a mixed methods design that combines qualitative interviews
and quantitative patent data based on a case study ofHuawei Technologies. The results show that
the company divides research and development between establishedWestern and domestic Chi-
nese locations, transferring oﬀshore employees’ innovative ideas to develop them into products in
China. We ﬁnd that this bridges Huawei’s current lack of domestic innovation capability.
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4.1 Introduction
Emerging-marketmultinational enterprises (EMNEs) in particular fromAsia have gainedmarket
shares by absorbing leading technologies in centers of state-of-the-art technology, often located
in establishedWestern countries, and proﬁting from low labor costs at home (Luo&Tung, 2007;
Mathews, 2002, 2006; Poon et al., 2006). However, this is not a favorable position for them or
their home-countries in the long run, because it creates dependency on technology absorption.
Moreover, the companies’ competitive advantage mainly depends on lower wages and production
costs (Hansen et al., 2016), which is not a sustainable situation for them (Gereﬃ&Lee, 2012;Mu-
dambi, 2008). In order to improve their position, EMNEs need to increase their share of higher
value added activities and produce globally competitive technology. This requires EMNEs’ R&D
activities to change from adapting to innovating, which is a diﬃcult step because innovative activ-
ities require a very diﬀerent set of skills and capabilities. The question remains how EMNEs are
able to master this leap from a technology follower to a technology leader.
In order to shed light onto this questionwe analyze the technological coming-of-age of a company
that just recently became a leader in its industry: Huawei Technologies. Despite the most recent
struggles with the US government, the Chinese company underwent an extremely rapid develop-
ment between its ﬁrst larger international R&D activities in Sweden around 2004 and overtaking
Ericsson in annual sales in 2012. The case of Huawei is remarkable because it is among the few
Chinese companies that have managed to become a world leader in the telecommunications in-
dustry in a very short time, despite very high liabilities of origin (Fiaschi et al., 2017).
Now that Huawei is no longer a follower, it cannot rely on adopting technology from industry
leaders anymore but needs to create innovative products itself. An important distinction wemake
here based onAwate et al. (2012) is between innovation capability – the ability to create innovative
technology in-house – and output capabilities – the ability to produce innovative products with-
out necessarily being able to create the underlying technology. We know from previous studies
on Huawei’s oﬀshore R&D that the company conducts its most impactful R&D, as measurable
by patent data, at its oﬀshore locations in the US, Canada and Europe instead of its domestic lo-
cations in China (Schaefer & Liefner, 2017). As we generally observe an increasingly global split
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of tasks byMNEs following the value chain stage of their activities (Crescenzi et al., 2014, 2016),
the question remains if Huawei achieves innovation capability at its domestic locations or if it
relies on innovative input from abroad. Moreover, we are asking how the company integrates oﬀ-
shore and domestic R&D and how the company is compensated for the higher risks of managing
transnational R&D projects, including knowledge spillovers, loss of information in the transfer
process and political risks in the host countries (von Zedtwitz & Gassmann, 2002). Answering
these questions contributes to our knowledge about the changes in the geography of international
R&D fragmentation, which is one of the key areas for current research onR&D internationaliza-
tion and innovation identiﬁed by Papanastassiou et al. (2019). Pointing towards the importance
of these issues, Bathelt et al. (2018) note that the ﬁelds of EconomicGeography and International
Business are increasingly paying attention to the global dispersion of value creation. They state
that combining perspectives from both disciplines might help to explain the rationales behind
MNEs’ behaviors, which shape the global landscape of innovative activity. This study aims to
contribute to our understanding of the spatial arrangement of value creation and the resulting
dependencies between locations by analyzing the micro-level processes of innovation and knowl-
edge creation such as ﬁrms, teams or individuals. Thus we contribute to a literature that has so far
mostly focused on the macro-level analysis of countries and industries (Andersson et al., 2002).
In order to explore howHuawei creates innovative technology, the study combines interview and
patent data to illuminate the mechanisms of upgrading and to understand the spatial pattern of
Huawei’s innovative activities. Following this mixed-methods approach, we start with the qual-
itative part that inductively generates ﬁndings from the interviews, which are then discussed in
the light of the existing literature. From this discussion, we deduce hypotheses that are tested in
the following quantitative part. We then integrate the ﬁndings from both parts to draw broader
conclusions. The study contributes to the literature by showing how splittingR&DhelpsHuawei
produce state-of-the-art products and become a technological leader. The results show that the
company’s domestic activities have not yet caught up on innovation capability, creating a depen-
dency on the inﬂow of innovative ideas from abroad.
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4.2 Case context: Huawei’s global ascent
Because of its political brisance today, few recent high quality studies on Huawei neither con-
demn nor hype the company. While only a few researchers have had systematic insights into the
micro level of Huawei’s activities, as the company is known to be reluctant to open up to indepen-
dent journalists and researchers, most studies have been conducted based on secondary evidence
such as public company reports and patent data. In the literature Huawei has been used as an
outstandingly successful case of a Chinese company that performed upgrading through an R&D
intensive strategy (Boutellier et al., 2008). The company was founded in the late 1980s in Shen-
zhen in southeast China and after becoming successful on the Chinese market by focusing on
low-cost technology for rural areas, employed a similar growth strategy to emergingmarkets such
as India, South Africa or Latin America (Lee et al., 2016; Micheli & Carrillo, 2016). In the early
2000s, the company started focusing more on state-of-the-art technology in order to expand its
sales to more established markets. In order to absorb knowledge and signal competence, Huawei
started to use technological consulting, set up R&D alliances with companies such as Texas In-
struments or Intel and started collaborating with established universities (Chang et al., 2017; Fan,
2011; Lee et al., 2016; Liefner et al., 2019). The company also expanded its own R&D to global
innovation centers such as Silicon Valley and Silicon Prairie (Fan, 2011). For its oﬀshore R&D
activities, Huawei focused on hiring technological experts rather than using acquisitions (Chang
et al., 2017) because for example in theUS several attempts to acquire smaller technologically lead-
ing ﬁrms were blocked by theUS government for alleged security concerns (Chung &Mascitelli,
2015; Nolan, 2014). This catching-up by hiring enabledHuawei to keep a low proﬁle and navigate
liabilities of origin. In terms of technology, Huawei was able to sell its products below competi-
tors’ prices by proﬁting from its follower position and exploiting the cheaper labor costs at its
domestic location. However, in order to be competitive on a global scale, Huawei had to improve
its technological capabilities considerably (Chang et al., 2017). In 2012, Huawei surpassed for-
mer market leader Ericsson for the ﬁrst time in annual revenue (Lee et al., 2016). Nevertheless,
Schaefer & Liefner (2017) ﬁnd that Huawei does its highest impact R&D abroad instead of at its
headquarters. Therefore, the question remains as to howmuch of its core innovative activities are
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based in Huawei’s home market.
4.3 Mixed-Methods case study design
We chose Huawei as a case because it represents a very current example of an EMNE reaching
global player status, which enables us to study its recent upgrading process (Hernandez & Guil-
lén, 2018). Moreover, Huawei is a special case as the company does not mainly rely on acquiring
technologically advanced companies but directly hires the technological experts it needs to gain
speciﬁc expertise. We mix sources from in- and outside the ﬁrm in order to avoid what Tokatli
(2015) calls the ’dark side’ of ﬁrm-centric case studies: falling for the corporate narrative. Huawei’s
narrative is that the company reached its global status because of the dedication and hardships en-
dured by the Chinese R&D employees in order to create high-tech products, often attested for by
the story of new employees receiving amattress for sleeping in the oﬃce. Moreover, many sources
describe how the devotion and self-sacriﬁce of founderRenZhengfeimotivated employees to sur-
pass expectations. These narratives repeatedly come up in press articles as well as interview-based
research on the company (de Cremer & Tao, 2015; Luo et al., 2011).
The case study follows a sequential embeddedmixed-methods design in order to study themecha-
nisms and the role of diﬀerent locations inHuawei’s upgrading-process. The interviewees for the
qualitative analysis represent a subgroup of the inventors on the patents used for the quantitative
analysis. They were selected to represent the diﬀerent oﬀshore locations and the diverse profes-
sional and cultural backgrounds of the interviewees, thus providing multiple perspectives on the
companies’ oﬀshore R&D activities (Yin, 2014). The data types are considered equal and the se-
quential nature of the chosen exploratory approach is maximizing the insights of the research
topic (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Hurmerinta-Peltomäki &Nummela, 2006; Kuckartz, 2014).
We ﬁrst collect patent data to identify locations and potential interviewees. We then conduct the
interviews and analyze them. From the interview results, we develop hypotheses that we test by
using the patent data. Finally, we integrate the ﬁndings from both analyses in order to draw our
conclusions (see Figure 4.1). The qualitative part enables us to understand themechanisms of how
76
Chapter 4
innovations are created and distributed within the company. The quantitative part is more suited
to observe changes over time and analyze the broader patterns across locations. By unveiling the
underlyingmechanisms of transnational innovation throughqualitative analysis, we bridge a blind
spot that patent data based research typically has.
Fig. 4.1: Mixed-Methods Design
4.4 Qualitative Analysis
4.4.1 Interviews
The interviews were conducted between February and October of 2017 with former and current
employees at Huawei’s oﬀshore R&D centers. In order to gain a more nuanced understanding
of the internal mechanisms, we interviewed 40 experts from eight diﬀerent oﬀshore locations of
the company, representing the biggest and most active ones in patent application: San Jose, Dal-
las, San Diego, Chicago, Bridgewater, Ottawa, Stockholm and Munich. Some experts were not
assigned to a speciﬁc location. The experts were selected via their patenting activity for Huawei.
The sample contains mostly industry experts with work experience from established competitors
and academia but also fromHuawei China. Including the perspective of inventors who have a cul-
tural insider perspective onChina or onHuawei inChina is a very valuable addition to the sample.
The main questions for the semi-structured interviews address the tasks of the oﬀshore experts
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and the oﬀshore locations, as well as the communicationwithin the company. An overview of typ-
ical questions for the interviews is provided in the appendix. Nevertheless, the questions changed
throughout the interview period according to new insights from the interviews. For example, in
order to learn about Huawei’s upgrading process we initially started out asking about how the in-
terviewees provide access to the local knowledge base and how that knowledge is then transferred.
We foundout early that the interviewees have only little professional exchange outside of the com-
pany once they work for Huawei. Therefore, the oﬀshore experts are not so much connectors to
knowledge from outside but themain source of knowledge themselves. Following this ﬁnding, we
shifted our focus away from their outside connections towards the interviewees themselves.
The interviews were analyzed by using the qualitative analysis software MaxQDA. The coding
process took place in three steps. First, the material was sorted into broader partly overlapping
ﬁelds of interest to make it more accessible, such as personal education and career background,
tasks at Huawei as well as external and internal connections. Through the knowledge obtained
from the interviews and the ﬁrst round of thematic coding, sub questions to the broader research
question about the role of Huawei’s oﬀshore R&D in upgrading the company’s technology were
derived:
• How does the skill set of the oﬀshore and the domestic employees diﬀer? Why? Does it
change over time?
• How is internal cooperation between the locations organized? Which aims are the loca-
tions pursuing?
• What are the channels for idea transfer? How successful are they? How do the channels
change over time?
These questions were used for the second round of coding, this time using an inductive coding
procedure in order to keep an open mind towards the perspectives of the interviewees. The third
step was the consolidation of the inductive codes to see which statements refer to the same phe-
nomenon. The text passages in the consolidated codes were then split along the interviewee vari-
ables shown in Figure 4.2, using the segment matrix of the program. This enabled us to see the
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diﬀerent perspectives the interviewees have while analyzing the text according to our sub ques-
tions. We then used the tables and coding-memos to summarize our ﬁndings and answer the sub
questions.
Fig. 4.2: Interviewee variables
4.4.2 Qualitative Findings
From the interviews, we learned that the experts see a gap between Huawei’s oﬀshore and do-
mestic R&D capability, claiming that employees in China have caught up on technological and
organizational knowledge while they are still struggling to create new "ideas". In the terms of the
interviewees, knowledge refers to technological knowledge often obtained from university that is
needed to understand state-of-the-art technology and develop such products. In contrast, ideas are
outlines for new technologies or parts thereof beyond the state-of-the-art that require profound
knowledge and understanding of the technology but also creativity and industry experience. We
also distinguish a third category, which is organizational knowledge, to which the interviewees
refer mostly indirectly, which describes for instance the ability to put together and manage inno-
vative teams. The interviewees claim that the Chinese engineers know how to do things but they
donot knowwhat todo, a questionoften left to the oﬀshore expertswho state that their colleagues
in China need to improve "how to be innovative" and "think outside the box". The R&D done in
Chinamostly aims formore incremental improvementswhile research abroad createsmore break-
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through novelties.
It becomes apparent from the interviews that themain reason for this capability gap is the pool of
mainly young graduates fromuniversity, often the best of their cohorts, with only little work expe-
rience or exposure to the global industry, whichHuawei is able to hire from inChina. In contrast,
Huawei’s oﬀshore employees are mostly experienced senior engineers that have been working for
one of Huawei’s big competitors or in academia for a minimum of ﬁve years. Another factor in-
ﬂuencing the work done abroad and at home comes from diﬀerent ways of approaching tasks.
The engineers in China often employ a trial and error approach from which they learn. This is
feasible because they are more numerous and their labor less costly for Huawei.
The interview material indicates the awareness for the need of high quality R&D developed in
the later phase of Huawei’s internationalization. Some oﬀshore experts report that in the early
days of internationalization, the engineers in China were even resistant towards new technical ap-
proaches and ideas at ﬁrst. The ﬁrst step was to catch-up on state-of-the-art knowledge, which
was done in the earlier phase of internationalization through the transfer of technological as well
as organizational knowledge. Interviewees with a long employment history at Huawei emphasize
how fast their colleagues in China caught up on state-of-the-art technology. Nevertheless, the
interviewees point out that the capability of the Chinese R&D varies between diﬀerent ﬁelds as
Huawei works on a very broad range of technologies from analogous to digital in-house.
In the early stages ofHuawei’s upgrading, the company used oﬀshore experts to bridge the knowl-
edge gap between them and the global industry. The oﬀshore experts were sent to represent
Huawei in standardization and EU ﬁnanced research projects or talk to customers. Their role
changed when Huawei caught up on state-of-the-art knowledge and aspired to become an indus-
try leader. Now they provide the company with innovative ideas, for which they draw from their
long-term experience. Therefore, the main ideas for innovative products come from abroad while
the engineers inChina do the ﬁne-tuning. Transferring their ideas toChina causes discontent for
some oﬀshore engineers, because they are not involved in bringing their own idea to the market,
which many of them are used to from working for established competitors.
Following the endowment with capabilities discussed above, we ﬁnd that the oﬀshore and domes-
tic R&D locations fulﬁll diﬀerent tasks in Huawei’s innovation process. Ideas from abroad have
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to be taken to China where the larger and less costly workforce takes over the more work inten-
sive tasks, aligning development with production. While the oﬀshore locations are mostly doing
research, the domestic locations are focusing on the development. The interviewees claim that
today, the gap in experience between oﬀshore and domestic engineers might be slowly closing.
Huawei’s headquarters hierarchically control the ﬂow of information, directing all communica-
tion between oﬀshore R&D locations through China. All oﬀshore locations work closely with
Huawei’s respective technology hubs in China, where Shenzhen, for example, would be more ori-
ented towards telecom and Beijing more towards internet. The interviewees state that working
with the respective locations in China is highly encouraged byHuawei, while competition within
the company hinders the exchange of ideas between oﬀshore locations. In a few cases, engineers
from diﬀerent oﬀshore locations worked together, but the interviewees claim that this kind of
exchange was not encouraged by the headquarters. The direction of exchange is very clear. The
interviewees claim that the oﬀshore side is expected to meticulously report their work to China
while the domestic side remains silent. Some interviewees even used the term "teaching" for their
interaction with the Chinese engineers.
Huawei uses various channels for the transnational transfer of knowledge and ideas. Manyprojects
teams consist of oﬀshore and domestic engineers to ensure that results are directly transferred to
China. The interviewees state that the particular transfer channel depends on how complex the
technology is. A lot of knowledge exchange happens via personal contact. Many of the intervie-
wees travel regularly to the respective technology hub in China, which in some cases helped to
establish personal relationships to Chinese co-workers and improve communication between do-
mestic and oﬀshore locations. Visitors usually give presentations, explain the newest technology
in detail to their coworkers inChina and distribute the slides containing the technical details. The
exchange via documents and slides is feasible over distance and helps to overcome language barri-
ers by using universally understood mathematical formulas and technical drawings. Other forms
of communication over distance are video conferences, desktop sharing and electronic messag-
ing. Another mechanism is engineer expatriates fromChina working for one to three years at the
oﬀshore location. Their task is to help with the communication with China by translating and
to transfer the knowledge they acquire abroad back to China. However, this practice is used less
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frequently now.
Some experts say that it was sometimes diﬃcult to work with co-workers in China, because of
the cultural and language barriers as well as spatial distance and the time diﬀerence that requires
nightly phone conferences. Moreover, there are certain technologies, in particular those of mil-
itary relevance, that fall under export control rules, which means those technologies cannot be
transferred to China. In summary, the company’s R&D in China has caught up on technological
and organizational knowledge, but not on how to create innovative ideas because of lack of expe-
rience of the young Chinese employees. Therefore, the company transfers ideas from abroad via
various channels to its domestic R&D where the development takes place.
4.4.3 Theoretical discussion
In the following, we connect our ﬁndingswith the literature to look deeper into the characteristics
of the idea transfer and prepare the hypotheses for the quantitative analysis. In the theoretical dis-
cussion we follow the deﬁnitions of Andersson et al. (2016) where technology refers to a machine
or tool, innovation to the creation of new ideas for those technologies or the production thereof
and knowledge is the underlying understanding of the above. Adding to this deﬁnition, experience
is the result of accumulating knowledge. The lack of experience at Huawei’s domestic locations
is one of the reason for the innovation capability gap we observe in our case study. Experience
is determined by the time and intensity spend on knowledge accumulation. Broader experience
reinforces creativity because more previously unconnected knowledge can be connected to create
ideas (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011; Nijstad et al., 2010). Zooming out, experience can also be
seen as the cumulative accomplishment of a task, which can be spatially concentrated in locations
with a long history of performing the task, making experience context speciﬁc and inﬂuenced by
geography, time and organization (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 2011). Thus, we ﬁnd that not only
experience in general is required to create innovative ideas for the global telecommunications in-
dustry, but a speciﬁc kind obtained from operating in this global industry environment, which
Huawei’s domestic engineers have not been exposed to suﬃciently in the past.
Moreover, what is needed for creating products that nobody has thought of before is the capabil-
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ity to combine previously unconnected parts of knowledge (Bharadwaj &Menon, 2000;MacLean
et al., 2015;Mascitelli, 2000). One of the reasons why employees trained in culturallyWestern ed-
ucation systemshave advantages for detecting novel directions for technology development is that
the education is at least partly built on the concept of Socratic dialectics. It emphasizes question-
ing the status-quomuchmore than theConfucian educationmodel found inChina andotherEast
Asian economies (Marginson, 2011, 2018; Tweed & Lehman, 2002), which focuses on repetitive
and teacher-centered learning. This educates people to be very good at following predetermined
ways laid out by others, but not to be creative in the sense of leaving these paths and exploring un-
known territory (Abrami et al., 2014; Cao et al., 2009; Woronov, 2008). The result is that many
Chinese engineers are not trained to break with the status-quo.
Rietzschel et al. (2007) argue that experience and the ability to make use of the individual pool
of knowledge are crucial for developing new ideas. We ﬁnd that the oﬀshore expert’s seniority
and education is oﬀering a greater pool of industry speciﬁc experience and a better training to
search for new ideas compared to the domestic engineers. This is in line with our ﬁnding that
the oﬀshore locations are the primary locus of original idea generation at Huawei. Therefore, the
company has to deal with the issue of transferring ideas caused by the immobility of the innova-
tion capability needed to create ideas. First, it is commonplace that highly qualiﬁed people found
in centers of state-of-the-art knowledge prefer not tomove, so their knowledge appears to be sticky
(Hippel, 1994) and attached to these places. Second, because tacit components make up a large
portion of the capability of creating new products, the transfer of those capabilities is extremely
complicated. Transferring all capabilities necessary for the creative process itself is a lot more
diﬃcult than transferring the results of it. This motivates Huawei to set up subsidiaries abroad
and transfer ideas created there for immediate access to innovation capabilities. This bridging of
lack of innovation capabilities is in line with Luo & Tung (2018), who propose that springboard
MNEsmight use knowledge resources abroad directly to compensate for what they are not good
at. The ability to properly orchestrate the idea creation and transfer in such a transnational setting
is an intangible asset for ﬁrms and an important part of value creation (Andersson et al., 2016). In
order to look deeper into the orchestration of Huawei’s global R&D, we are building upon these
insights and derive our hypotheses for the quantitative analyses. The ﬁrst hypothesis is concerned
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with the direction of idea transfer.
Hypothesis 1: Because of a better endowment with innovation capability, Huawei strategically
aims at transferring ideas from oﬀshore to domestic locations. Therefore, ideas from abroad are
more likely to be transferred to domestic locations than vice versa and take shorter time to be
transferred.
In the literature, the role of a ﬁrm’s knowledge is conceptualized as a key resource in the resource
based view of the ﬁrm (Wernerfelt, 1984) and as playing a central role in creating combinative
and dynamic capabilities (Kogut&Zander, 1992;Teece et al., 1997; Zahra&George, 2002). These
competences canbe further developed throughcycles of knowledge absorption and learning (Non-
aka, 1991). Luo & Tung (2018) explain that springboard MNEs use an upward spiral of self-
improvement, where companies ﬁrst need to build a knowledge base before tapping into critical
technologies and talents. We learn from the interviews that Huawei had to acquire technologi-
cal and organizational knowledge over time, which forms the base of transferring ideas today. To
learnmore about the eﬀect of experience on idea transfer, we are testing the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: Over time, Huawei becomes increasingly capable of smoothly transferring ideas
through building technological and organization knowledge. Thus, the time it takes to transfer
ideas within the company is expected to decrease with increasing company experience.
We learn from the interviews that the Chinese employees seem to be catching-up on experience
and innovation capability. We therefore ask if the transfer of ideas from the domestic to the
oﬀshore locations becomes more systematic and therefore faster over time.
Hypothesis 2b: Over time, Huawei’s locations in China start to gain experience and build inno-
vation capability, so that oﬀshore locations increasingly pick up ideas from domestic locations to
build upon. Therefore, the time to transfer ideas from domestic to oﬀshore locations decreases
with increasing company experience.
Further, we are looking deeper into the preconditions for a successful transfer of ideas. The litera-
ture describes that a successful transfer depends heavily on the absorptive capacity of the receiving
unit in the formof familiarity with the technological background of the idea (Cohen&Levinthal,
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1990). InHuawei’s case, the impact of absorptive capacity on transfer is supposed to be higher for
the transfer of ideas from oﬀshore to domestic locations as there is generally less experience at do-
mestic locations. We also argue thatmore intense experience with the idea at the sending location
makes the transfer easier. Therefore, we arrive at the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a: Huawei uses its internationalization eﬀort systematically to organize transfer of
ideas by developing sending capacity in oﬀshore locations as well as receiving capacity in China.
Thus, high sending capacity and high receiving capacity are signiﬁcant positive drivers of idea
transfer process, in particular from oﬀshore to domestic locations.
Moreover, ideas based onmore intricate and complicated knowledge aremore diﬃcult to transfer
between locations. The transfer of those ideas needs more intense exchange between people such
as face-to-face contact instead of electronic exchange channels, which prolongs the transfer.
Hypothesis 3b: The successful transfer of ideas also depends on the intricacy of the underlying
knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge intricacy of ideas is signiﬁcantly hindering and slowing
down the transfer process.
From a strategic perspective, the global novelty of the idea is also an important factor for its trans-
fer. Ideas that are close to or even pushing the global state-of-the-art need to be distributed fast
within the company in order to reap the beneﬁts of novelty. This is particularly important in the
direction of product development so the idea can be translated into a product quickly.
Hypothesis 3c: The transfer of ideas also depends on the global novelty of it. Thus, the closer
the idea is to the global frontier, the faster it will be transferred. This eﬀect is stronger for global
novelties that are created at oﬀshore locations.
4.5 Quantitative Analysis
4.5.1 Data
For the quantitative analysis, we use patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce (USPTO) retrieved in March 2019 by using the PatentsView application-programming
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interface 1. Using patents fromUSPTOprovides only new-to-the-world patents and patents that
fulﬁll international quality standards. Because patent applications are often submitted tomultiple
patent oﬃces, the USPTO data set covers not only patents created in the US but from all over
the world giving insights into ideas originating from China and Europe. The USPTO coverage
of R&D activities in Europe is higher or very similar compared to the European Patent Oﬃce
(EPO), also for most European countries (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Data coverage USPTO and EPO for applications until 2014
Inventor Location USPTO EPO
Canada 330 136
Germany 133 142
Sweden 204 129
US 1623 557
China 7098 9018
Rest EU 151 49
Asia 65 34
Rest ofWorld 63 27
In order to operationalize new ideas, we are using the ﬁrst-time combination of technological
components as a proxy for new-to-the-ﬁrm ideas. Every pair of components appearing on the
same patent is counted as a combination. This approach has been used in the literature before,
where the novelty of ideas is measured as unusual or new combinations of technology (sub)classes
on patents (Fleming, 2001; Kim et al., 2016). Even if not every single new combination necessarily
represents a break-through innovation, this approach enables us to look at the bigger picture of
the distribution of new ideas within the company.
The classiﬁcation we use is the Cooperative Patent Classiﬁcation (CPC)2 developed by the EPO
and USPTO in order to harmonize patent classiﬁcations. The components are the technology
groups on the patents. Groups aremoreﬁne-grained thanSubclasses but still represent technolog-
ical components, compared to the even more detailed Subgroups, which also include application
mechanismsof components. Table 4.2 gives an example of a typical technologyonwhichHuawei’s
inventors work. The Subclass classiﬁcation "Telephone Communication" is still relatively broad,
whereas the group "Substation equipment" describes a more speciﬁc technological component.
1patentsview.org/api
2cooperativepatentclassiﬁcation.org/cpcSchemeAndDeﬁnitions.html
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The Subgroup describes a mechanism for the component.
Table 4.2: CPC classiﬁcation hierarchy with example
H Section Electricity
H04 Class Electric communication technique
H04M Subclass Telephone Communication
H04M 1/00 Group Substation equipment, e.g. for use by subscribers; Analogous
equipment at exchanges
H04M 1/73 Subgroup Battery saving arrangements by switching on/oﬀ the receiving circuit
[. . . ]
We use the inventor addresses to determine whether the idea was created in China or at one of
Huawei’s oﬀshore locations. Following our research design, we are only distinguishing between
the categories domestic or oﬀshore location. Using the priority date of the patent, we then cal-
culate how long it takes until the idea is transferred across location categories. The priority date
is the ﬁrst time a patent is submitted to a patent oﬃce worldwide, which means even if we ﬁnd
the patent via the USPTO, we use the date of its ﬁrst application in China or Europe to trace
its origin. We consider an idea as transferred once an inventor team at the opposite location is
able to apply the idea without help from inventors working at the original location. Therefore,
we exclude patents with mixed oﬀshore and domestic inventor teams, as they do not provide fur-
ther insights regarding our question. We also exclude the two most recent years 2017 and 2018
because of a possible time lag in patent applications with Chinese inventor teams ﬁled ﬁrst at the
China National Intellectual Property Administration (CNIPA). These could bias our data in fa-
vor of patents originating from US teams, which would appear in the data set earlier. We also
ﬁlter "born-global" ideas that appear for the ﬁrst time simultaneously at a domestic and oﬀshore
location, because they do not represent a transfer. We categorize patents created in Hong Kong
as domestic only because of its extreme spatial proximity to Huawei’s headquarters in Shenzhen.
4.5.2 Time-to-event analysis
We are using a survival or time-to-event analysis to analyze the time new ideas take to be trans-
ferred within the company. This method is commonly used in medical studies to model the in-
ﬂuence of covariates on patient survival time as the dependent variable. This type of analysis has
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been applied in Economic Geography before, for example when studying ﬁrm or project survival
(Cole et al., 2019; Falck et al., 2013;Neﬀke et al., 2012). The advantage of using time-to-event anal-
ysis over an ordinary least square (OLS) approach is that the Cox orWeibull distributions are a
better ﬁt to model time as a dependent variable, as time is non-negative and residuals are usually
not normally distributed. Moreover, it enables us to take into account observations that did not
experience the event, in our case the ideas that do not get transferred, to correctly estimate the
time to event. The event in our model is the ﬁrst time an idea appears at a location category op-
posite to the one from which it originates. The observation period starts when the idea appears
for the ﬁrst time and ends at the transfer or the last time it appears in the data, which is called
"right-censoring". Figure 4.3 gives an overview of the trajectories of ideas and howwemeasure our
dependent variable, the time until transfer.
Fig. 4.3: Categories for measuring transfer of ideas in the time-to-event analysis
The baseline hazard function for theWeibull model, which is the instantaneous failure rate with
all covariates being zero, if the observation has not yet experience the event (Moore, 2016), is given
by
h0(t) = λγtγ−1
with the scale and shape parameters λ > 0 and γ > 0 as well as 0 ≥ t > ∞. The proportional
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hazards model, which in our case describes the hazard of transfer at time t for the ith idea, is
hi(t) = exp(β1x1i+β2x2i+ ...+βpxpi)h0(t)
with i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The unit of observation in our model are ideas, measured as combinations of
technology groups.
The dependent variable for the model is the time until transfer of the idea, as described above. In
order to test the hypotheses, we deﬁne a set of independent variables. The detailed description of
the metric variables is attached in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.5 in the appendix. The variables origin
of the idea, is dichotomous, taking a value of 1 for oﬀshore locations and 0 for domestic locations
in China. The variable labeled experience of the company measures the company’s age in years
at the creation of the idea. The sending capacity of the idea is the intensity of application at the
sending location, measured as the number of occurrences normalized by the time between the
ﬁrst occurrence and the transfer. For the receiving location, we include the absorptive capacity,
which is the familiarity with each component of the idea, before the idea is transferred. This is
calculated analogues to the sending capacity taking the mean number and mean presence of both
components of the idea. Further, we include the knowledge intricacy of the idea as the average
number of technological components on thepatents associatedwith the idea. This gives us a proxy
of the intricacy of the knowledge underlying the technologies that include the idea. In addition,
we include the global novelty of the idea measured as the time between the ﬁrst appearance of
the idea among all USPTO patents and the ﬁrst appearance in the Huawei data set. This gives
an indication of how new the idea is overall. Finally, we include a dummy for the international
expansion ofHuawei’s R&Dactivities, which took oﬀ after 2006, to control for the lower number
of oﬀshore activity before.
Table 4.7 and 4.8 in the appendix give an overview of the descriptive statistics of the variables
and the correlation matrix of the independent variables, showing low correlations between the
independent variables. Table 4.3 shows the average values for the dependent variable for the origin
of ideas and the state of the transfer. Looking at the average time until transfer already gives us
an idea of the diﬀerences between the locations. While ideas from domestic locations take 4.37
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years on average to become transferred to oﬀshore locations, transferring ideas from oﬀshore to
domestic locations only takes 2.3 years.
Table 4.3: Average time until transfer
Origin: Domestic Origin: Oﬀshore Sum
Transferred 4.37
(1,420)
2.30
(353)
3.96
(1,773)
Not-Transferred 4.31
(1,512)
2.60
(391)
3.95
(1,901)
Sum 4.34
(2,932)
2.45
(744)
3.96
(3,676)
4.5.3 Quantitative ﬁndings
Figure 4.4 illustrates the Kaplan-Meier Curve of the survival probability over time, comparing
the origin categories of ideas. The two distinct curves show that the transfer from oﬀshore is
faster at any point in time and that the two lines are mostly parallel, conﬁrming the proportional
hazards assumption underlying the model. Table 4.4 displays the main results of the binomial
model in odds ratios and the results from theWeibullmodel as hazard ratios with upper and lower
boundaries, following a recent call by Wasserstein et al. (2019). The Coeﬃcients and asterisks
corresponding to Table 4.4 and the results of the robustness checks are reported in the appendix.
The binary event of whether the transfer happens or not gives a ﬁrst glimpse of Huawei’s R&D
strategy. We are reporting odds ratios for model (1) in Table 7 that show the change of odds to-
wards transfer versus no transfer for a one-unit change in the independent variable. Models (2) –
(4) report hazard ratios that show the percentage change in hazard rate for every additional unit
of the independent variable. These models allows us to investigate the temporal properties of the
transfer of ideas.
Turning to hypothesis one,model (1) shows that there is amuchhigher chance for an idea transfer
fromoﬀshore locations toChina (36percent). Model (2) shows that ideas fromoﬀshore locations
increase the hazard of transfer at a point estimate of 39 percent at any point in time compared to
the ideas fromChina. This conﬁrms the hypothesis that the transfer of ideas from abroad to do-
mestic locations is faster and more successful.
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Fig. 4.4: Kaplan-Meier Curve for the covariate "Origin of idea"
Table 4.4: Main results for GLM and time-to-event analysis
Dependent variable: transfer: yes / no time until transfer
Model (distribution): GLM (binomial) PH (Weibull)
Location: all all oﬀshore to
domestic
domestic to
oﬀshore
(1) (2) (3) (4)
origin of idea 1.359
(1.129-1.636)
1.386
(1.219-1.575)
company experience 0.782
(0.757-0.807)
1.119
(1.094-1.145)
1.008
(0.961-1.059)
1.155
(1.125-1.185)
sending capacity 1.00
(0.985-1.018)
1.066
(1.059-1.072)
1.070
(1.068-1.072)
1.137
(1.124-1.151)
absorptive capacity 1.775
(1.580-1.998)
1.240
(1.152-1.335)
1.178
(1.024-1.355)
1.261
(1.154-1.377)
knowledge intricacy 0.938
(0.902-0.974)
0.955
(0.928-0.983)
0.851
(0.799-0.907)
0.989
(0.957-1.021)
global novelty 1.033
(1.025-1.041)
1.019
(1.013-1.024)
1.011
(1.000-1.023)
1.021
(1.015-1.027)
international expansion 1.546
(1.189-2.013)
0.902
(0.767-1.060)
1.254
(0.725-2.168)
0.804
(0.675-0.958)
scale parameter λ - 0.004 0.186 0.001
shape parameter γ - 1.502 1.131 1.654
Observations 3,676 3,676 744 2,932
Log Likelihood -2,279.706 -5,203.786 -898.561 -4,244.483
Note:
GLM: Odds ratios are reported with upper and lower boundaries in parentheses
PH: Hazard ratios reported with upper and lower boundaries in parentheses
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Turning towards the second hypotheses on experience, model (2) shows that while the company
gains experience, the hazard of transfer increases, meaning a shorter time the transfer takes. This
conﬁrms hypothesis 2a about the transfer process becoming faster over time. In addition, an in-
teresting insight comes from model (1): With the company maturing, the likelihood of an idea
transfer decreases by 12 percent for each additional year of experience. Together with our ﬁnding
about hypothesis 2a, this shows that there is less but faster transfer as the company gains experi-
ence. The reason for this might be that the company focused earlier at absorbing ideas, turning to
fewer but more promising ideas over time while gaining the capability to transfer those selected
ideas faster.
For hypothesis 2b, we ﬁnd in model (3) and (4) that experience decreasing transfer time is only
clear for domestic locations that transfer ideas to oﬀshore. From the independent nature of ex-
perience for oﬀshore locations, we can interpret that the oﬀshore locations possess the transfer
abilities from the beginning of their operations. Moreover, it shows that the transfer of ideas
fromdomestic locations becomes faster with increasing experience, indicating that over time they
might start to create valuable ideas that are taken to oﬀshore locations to build upon. These ﬁnd-
ings conﬁrm hypothesis 2b.
Next, we assess hypotheses three on sending and receiving capacities. Model (1) shows that while
the sending capacity is not aﬀecting the transfer, absorptive capacity is a very important driver
of the transfer process. Model (3) shows that the sending capacity of the oﬀshore locations is
signiﬁcantly decreasing the time of transfer by 7 percent. Likewise, the absorptive capacity for
the domestic location signiﬁcantly increases the hazard of transfer by 18 percent, showing that
experience with the components on the receiving side decreases the time of transfer. Neverthe-
less, the coeﬃcients inmodel (4) for transfer fromdomestic to oﬀshore locations are even higher,
only partly conﬁrming hypothesis 3a. We interpret the higher coeﬃcients in model (4) as higher
demand for experience on both the sending and receiving location. Nevertheless, the ﬁndings con-
ﬁrm that idea transfer depends on prior experience, in particular on the receiving side.
Concerninghypothesis 3b,model (1) shows that ahigher knowledge intricacydecreases the chance
of an idea transfer between 10 and 3 percent for each additional technology component. Model
(2) shows that in terms of speed, knowledge intricacy is decreasing the hazard of transfer by 4.5
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percent for each additional mean component in the technology that uses the idea. Comparing
model (3) and (4) shows that the direction of the eﬀect is only clear for oﬀshore locations trans-
ferring ideas to China. Complex ideas from domestic locations sent out to oﬀshore locations do
not suﬀer under higher intricacy, because experts at oﬀshore locations understand complicated
technologies more quickly due to a priori experience. These ﬁnding conﬁrm hypothesis 3b.
Concerning the global novelty of the idea, we ﬁnd inmodel (1) that each additional year the idea is
on themarket increases the transfer chance by 3 percent. In addition, the hazard rate is increasing
the older and therefore further from the state-of-the-art the idea is. However, this eﬀect is only
signiﬁcant for ideas that are transferred from domestic locations to oﬀshore locations. Based on
this observation, we need to reject hypothesis 3c. Nevertheless, this ﬁnding seems not surprising
considering that newer ideas might also be more diﬃcult and time consuming to transfer, in par-
ticular regarding the ﬁndings about the intricacy of knowledge slowing down the transfer process.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The last decades have seen a rich literature that is concerned with the strategies of technological
upgrading in MNEs from emerging economies such as China. The central developmental bot-
tlenecks discussed include a lack of knowledge and innovation capabilities. We ﬁnd that the core
competence of a latecomerﬁrmmust undergo several radical shifts during theﬁrm’s development,
inducing changing roles of the ﬁrm’s locations within its global innovation network.
In order to jump ahead of competitors, Huawei needed to create innovative state-of-the-art tech-
nology itself. Nevertheless, creating innovative products is not necessarily a sign that the company
managed to obtain so-called innovation capability, but can be achieved through relying on exter-
nal innovative input through which the company gains output capabilities (Awate et al., 2012).
The qualitative analysis shows the lack of experience for idea creation at domestic locations in
Huawei’s global R&D network. In order to bridge this lack of innovativeness, Huawei splits its
R&D activities between established industry locations abroad and domestic locations in China.
The company harnesses the creativity of oﬀshore experts and channels the ﬂow of ideas to its
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domestic locations, where the ideas are developed to products, creating output capability for the
company. The key mechanism enabling this development is the strategic division of labor within
the R&D process. This mechanism required Huawei’s domestic locations to catch up on orga-
nizational and technical knowledge, which they did through knowledge absorption in the initial
phase. Gaining absorptive capacity enables the domestic locations to use the oﬀshore experts’
novel ideas to develop state-of-the-art technology. In accordance to our observation that themore
straight-forward developmental tasks within new product creation are taken to China, the liter-
ature observes that innovative processes are becoming increasingly ﬁne-sliced today, in order to
standardize repetitive parts (Andersson et al., 2016). Moreover, concentrating development activ-
ities at home provides scale and synergy eﬀects, proximity to the headquarters, lower communica-
tion costs and protection of commercial results (von Zedtwitz &Gassmann, 2002). For Huawei,
our analysis adds low labor costs and the positive side eﬀect of stirring the internal ﬂow of ideas
and knowledge towards China.
The results of the survival analysis show that oﬀshore locations transfer ideas systematically to
China and that experience is a critical ingredient for a fast transfer. The expertise of the oﬀshore
locations is the result of an eﬀective search for talent at the right locations, which is reﬂected in
the results from the qualitative and quantitative analysis. Another evident ﬁnding is the gradual
and systematic accumulation of experience atHuawei’s domestic locations and therefore possibly
changing roles in the spatial split of tasks.
Nevertheless, even if the currentmarket position of the ﬁrm as of 2019marks the successful trans-
formation from a follower to a technology leader; we ﬁnd that the spatial split of R&D produces
a dependency on the inﬂow of ideas from abroad. The company has not yet managed to conduct
its highest value added R&D at its domestic locations, due to the lack of innovation capability
available inChina. Nevertheless, the data shows that the ﬂow of ideas fromChina increases speed
over time, indicating that Huawei might be improving its innovation capability at home. What
still needs further investigation is the quality and function of ideas coming from this direction.
As part of the further development, it can be expected that as the quality of ideas from China in-
creases over time, the function of oﬀshore locations might become less relevant within Huawei’s
global R&D network.
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Methodologically, this study is the ﬁrst to use novel combinations of technological components
on patents within a ﬁrm as a proxy to study the internal ﬂow of ideas. Nevertheless, we can only
interpret ideas on patents as a proxy for transfer because we know from the interviews that every
oﬀshore locations works closely with a domestic location and that there are mechanisms in place
that facilitate the exchange of ideas between them. It would be too imprecise to use this method
for companies without those strong ties or even whole industries.
This study contributes to the theory of latecomer ﬁrms by showing how R&D internationaliza-
tion can bridge a lack of innovation capabilities and support a quick build-up of market compet-
itiveness. One apparent hallmark of Huawei’s transformation to a technological front-runner is
strategically locating in the search for creative personnel andmatching this oﬀshore activity with
deliberate transfer to domestic R&D centers seems. This process of "search-match-transfer" may
mark a new feature of upgrading strategies for EMNEs. In the case of Huawei, this feature re-
sponds to shorter technology cycles and ensures quicker idea generation and transfer. Neverthe-
less, this approach also leads to a dependency on oﬀshore activities, which can be risky for late-
comers as the current conﬂict between Huawei and the US government shows.
Moreover, the study shows that the phenomenon the literature usually discusses as knowledge
transfer needs a more nuanced conceptualization, because the role of technological and organiza-
tional knowledge as well as ideas changes during the various stages of latecomer catch-up. From
a policy perspective, the study shows how the support of emerging market governments for their
ﬁrm’sR&D internationalization can enable a quicker path to selling globally competitive products
if hiring abroad strategically aims at experienced and creative experts. Nevertheless, even if those
EMNEs are then able to position themselves in the global market, there still need to be mecha-
nisms in place that pull the higher value added activities towards the home country in order to
reap the beneﬁts of value creation and become more independent from potentially risky oﬀshore
activities.
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Appendix for Chapter 4
Table 4.5: Overview of anonymized semi-structured interviews
Interviewee ID Month of interview Employment Region Currently working for
Huawei?
EU01 02.2017 Europe no
EU02 02.2017 Europe no
EU03 02.2017 Europe no
EU04 03.2017 Europe no
US01 03.2017 USA no
US02 05.2017 USA no
US03 05.2017 USA yes
US04 05.2017 USA no
US05 05.2017 USA no
US06 05.2017 USA no
US07 05.2017 USA no
US08 05.2017 USA no
US09 05.2017 USA no
US10 06.2017 USA no
US11 06.2017 USA no
US12 06.2017 USA no
US13 06.2017 USA yes
US14 06.2017 USA yes
US15 06.2017 USA yes
US16 06.2017 USA yes
US17 06.2017 USA yes
EU05 06.2017 Europe no
US18 06.2017 USA no
US19 06.2017 USA yes
EU06 07.2017 Europe no
US20 07.2017 USA no
EU07 07.2017 Europe no
EU08 08.2017 Europe yes
US21 08.2017 USA no
CA01 08.2017 Canada yes
EU09 08.2017 Europe no
CA02 08.2017 Canada no
CA03 08.2017 Canada yes
EU10 08.2017 Europe yes
EU11 08.2017 Europe no
CA04 08.2017 Canada yes
EU12 08.2017 Europe yes
CA05 09.2017 Canada yes
EU13 09.2017 Europe yes
EU14 09.2017 Europe yes
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Additional data material
Table 4.6: Description of metric variables
idea i
component 1 c1
component 2 c2
technical component c ∈ {c1,c2}
day d
receiving location r
origin location o
technology subunit x ∈ {i,c1,c2}
location l ∈ {r,o}
number of patents at location l containing x at day d nl,x,d
number of components on patent p containing idea i ci,p
date of start of world-wide observation of x wx
date of start of company-wide observation of x at
location l
sx,l
date of event (transfer of i) ei
founding date of company (approximation) f = 1987.01.01
global novelty tw,i = (si, l−wi)/365,25
company age (at start of observation in years) tx,l =
sx,l− f
365,25
company age at event in years t f ,i = ei− f365,25
time-to-event tse,x,l =
ei−sx,l
365,25
mean presence of components tm,i,l =
(tse,c1,l+tse,c2,l)
2
mean appearance of components at receiving location nm,i,r =
∑
ec1
d=sc1
nr,c1,d+∑
ec2
d=sc2
nr,c2,d
2
absorptive capacity for the idea at the receiving location ACi = log
(
nm,i,r
tm,i,r
t f ,i
∗100
)
sending capacity for the idea at the origin location SCi =
∑
ei
d=si
no,i,d
tse,i,l
t f ,i
∗100
knowledge intricacy kci = ∑
ci,p
ni
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Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics of covariates
Metric dependent
variable PH
mean standard deviation min max
time until transfer 3.96 3.09 0.01 15.58
Metric covariates
company experience 22.74 3.70 12.60 29.00
sending capacity
(sending location)
0.71 4.41 0.02 191.00
absorptive capacity
(receiving location)
0.18 0.67 -2.06 4.54
knowledge intricacy 5.85 2.00 2.00 14.00
global novelty 23.82 10.54 0.00 63.97
Dummy dependent
variable GLM
1 0 Frequency of 1 Frequency of 0
transfer of idea yes no 1903 1773
Dummy covariates
origin of idea oﬀshore location domestic location 744 2932
international
expansion
after expansion before expansion 2939 737
Table 4.8: Correlation matrix of covariates
origin of
idea
company
experi-
ence
sending
capacity
(sending
location)
absorptive
capacity
(receiv-
ing
location)
knowledge
intricacy
global
novelty
company experience 0.283
sending capacity
(sending location)
0.048 0.057
absorptive capacity
(receiving location)
0.169 -0.032 0.033
knowledge intricacy 0.130 0.220 0.006 -0.018
global novelty 0.073 0.331 0.001 -0.190 -0.096
international expansion 0.217 0.757 0.033 -0.018 0.143 0.265
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Fig. 4.5: Calculation of durations
Table 4.9: Coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance values corresponding to Table 4.4
Dependent Variable: time until transfer
Model: proportional hazards (Weibull distribution)
Location: all oﬀshore to domestic domestic to oﬀshore
(2) (3) (4)
origin of idea 0.326***
(0.065)
company experience 0.112***
(0.012)
0.009
(0.026)
0.144***
(0.013)
sending capacity 0.064***
(0.003)
0.046***
(0.005)
0.129***
(0.006)
absorptive capacity 0.215***
(0.038)
0.164**
(0.071)
0.232***
(0.045)
knowledge intricacy -0.046***
(0.015)
-0.161***
(0.033)
-0.011
(0.017)
global novelty 0.018***
(0.003)
0.011*
(0.006)
0.020***
(0.003)
international expansion -0.104
(0.083)
0.225
(0.280)
-0.218**
(0.089)
scale parameter λ 3.687*** 1.488*** 4.021***
shape parameter γ 0.407*** 0.121*** 0.503***
Observations 3,676 744 2,932
Log Likelihood -5,203.786 -898.561 -4,244.483
*: sign. at 0.1
**: sign. at 0.05
***: sign. at 0.01
Robustness checks
The shape parameter is similar for the two samples, conﬁrming a similar distribution of both.
The diagnostics plots in Figure 4.6 and 4.7 show generally parallel and non-crossing lines for the
two groups of idea origin, suggesting that a proportional hazardsWeibull model is adequate for
analyzing the data. Moreover, comparing estimated values and observed values shows that the
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data overall ﬁts the model, with only few observations out of line at the lower and upper end of
the distribution. We also compare our results to the results of other survival models as well as an
OLS model. Table 4.10 shows the results. Comparing our Weibull model from model 1 to the
exponential model in model 4, another fully parametric model, the results shows mostly slightly
smaller eﬀects sizes but the same direction of eﬀects on the dependent variable. Applying a semi
parametricCox regression inmodel 5, we ﬁnd a very similarmagnitude for the eﬀect and direction
on the dependent variable. Comparing the Log Likelihood and AIC measures of the models, we
ﬁnd that theWeibull model has a better ﬁt with the data.
Moreover, we test if our results hold for modeling the time until transfer for ideas with a mul-
tivariate OLS regression, containing only the transferred combinations in model 6. Because we
now interpret regression coeﬃcients instead of hazard ratios, a negative coeﬃcient means the
time until transfer is shorter, and therefore corresponds to a positive hazard ratio that indicates a
higher hazard for the transfer. The estimated coeﬃcients for origin of ideas, company experience,
sending capacity and knowledge intricacy reﬂect the same behavior as in Weibull models, while
estimated coeﬃcients for absorptive capacity, global novelty and international expansion are not
signiﬁcant, most likely due to the loss of information from the non-transferred ideas that cannot
be incorporated into a standard OLS-model.
In order to test potential biases caused by unsuited time period restrictions in the data set, we
adjust the dependent variable by limiting the period for transfer after the ﬁrst appearance of the
combination to ﬁve years. This eﬀectively exclude cases where the combination appears again af-
ter many years, not necessarily being the product of a direct transfer. Moreover, high values for
the dependent variable might bias the model, which we control for with this adjustment. Table
4.11 shows that themagnitude and direction of the results of themainmodel remain robust. Sum-
ming up, the results can be considered robust and the choice for the Weibull model over other
hazard models such as the Cox or Exponential model is justiﬁed.
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Fig. 4.6: Weibull diagnostics plot for groups
Fig. 4.7: General model ﬁt forWeibull distribution
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Table 4.10: Sensitivity analysis for transfer of ideas
Dependent Variable: time until transfer transfer: yes / no
Model: proportional hazards model OLS GLM
Weibull
(parametric)
Exponential
(parametric)
Cox
(semi
parametric)
Normal Binomial
(2) (5) (6) (7) (1)
origin of idea 0.326***
(0.065)
0.294***
(0.065)
0.342***
(0.066)
-0.631***
(0.142)
0.306***
(0.095)
company experience 0.112***
(0.012)
0.038***
(0.011)
0.133***
(0.012)
-0.519***
(0.024)
-0.246***
(0.016)
sending capacity 0.064***
(0.003)
0.045***
(0.003)
0.292***
(0.029)
-0.080***
(0.016)
0.001
(0.008)
absorptive capacity 0.215***
(0.038)
0.225***
(0.037)
0.212***
(0.038)
0.109
(0.076)
0.574***
(0.060)
knowledge intricacy -0.046***
(0.015)
-0.045***
(0.015)
-0.048***
(0.015)
0.201***
(0.035)
-0.064***
(0.020)
global novelty 0.018***
(0.003)
0.017***
(0.003)
0.019***
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.033***
(0.004)
international expansion -0.104
(0.083)
0.013
(0.083)
-0.042
(0.085)
0.039
(0.186)
0.436***
(0.134)
Observations 3,676 3,676 3,676 1,784 3,676
R2 - - 0.154 0.455 -
Log Likelihood -5,203.786 -5,373.341 -12,492.300 - -2,279.706
AIC 10,421.57 10,760.68 - 2,877.709 4,575.4
*: sign. at 0.1
**: sign. at 0.05
***: sign. at 0.01
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Table 4.11: Robustness check for 5-year time frame for transfer of ideas
Dependent Variable: time until transfer
Model: proportional hazards (Weibull distribution)
Location: all oﬀshore to
domestic
domestic to
oﬀshore
(8) (9) (10)
origin of idea 0.359***
(0.070)
company experience 0.134***
(0.014)
0.009
(0.027)
0.177***
(0.016)
sending capacity 0.058***
(0.003)
0.045***
(0.005)
0.119***
(0.007)
absorptive capacity 0.243***
(0.043)
0.148**
(0.075)
0.276***
(0.054)
knowledge intricacy -0.079***
(0.017)
-0.163***
(0.034)
-0.044**
(0.020)
global novelty 0.016***
(0.003)
0.012**
(0.006)
0.017***
(0.004)
international expansion -0.095
(0.115)
0.295
(0.344)
-0.322**
(0.127)
scale parameter λ 4.134*** 1.582*** 4.516***
shape parameter γ 0.325*** 0.104** 0.429***
Observations 3,676 744 2,932
Log Likelihood -3,699.616 -818.186 -2,834.764
*: sign. at 0.1
**: sign. at 0.05
***: sign. at 0.01
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Conclusions
5.1 Summary
In summary, this dissertation shows that Huawei’s particular global strategy is characterized by
a strong reliance on oﬀshore R&D, the acquisition of people rather than ﬁrms and the transfer
of oﬀshore ideas to its domestic locations. Article one analyzed the quality of Huawei’s oﬀshore
and domestic R&D activities. The ﬁrst step in analyzing the company’s oﬀshore R&D strategy
was creating an overview of its worldwide R&D activities, which showed that inventors living in
theUS createmost of the oﬀshore patents along with Sweden, Germany andCanada. Using data
frommultiple patent oﬃces provides a more nuanced picture of the gradient of R&D quality be-
tween the EMNE’s locations. The results show that there is clear evidence for a higher quality
of patents produced under foreign knowledge inﬂow compared to patents developed solely with
inventors from the EMNE’s home country. Higher patent quality can best be measured as the
number of patent citations representing scientiﬁc impact or the number of countries in which it
is used representing economic value. Another interesting ﬁnding is the low number of patents in-
cluding inventors from technologically advanced neighboring countries of China such as South
Korea and Japan. As a methodological insight, we ﬁnd that patent family size and forward cita-
tions are themost suitable indicators for measuring patent quality. In addition, we conclude from
the analysis that using data from more than one national patent oﬃce provides a more nuanced
picture of EMNEs’ international patenting activity.
Article two explainedhowHuawei’s oﬀshore experts helped the company tobecomeglobally com-
petitive. We ﬁnd that Huawei overcomes its liabilities by proﬁting from the embeddedness of its
oﬀshore hires in the global telecommunications industry, and the knowledge as well as experience
105
Chapter 5
those experts built during many years of working in the industry. This helps Huawei to build dy-
namic capabilities in combination with home country advantages such as cheap labor and access
to credit. Hiring key personnel abroad opens the door to a virtuous circle that enables the com-
pany to gain more and more access to resources provided by the global industry such as access to
standardization, EU projects, university cooperation, customers and suppliers as well as a pool of
qualiﬁed employees. Those resources were not accessible for Huawei in its home market. Com-
pared to acquisition, hiring oﬀshore experts through R&D greenﬁeld investments helps Huawei
to avoid legitimacy concerns in the host markets and to signal technological competence and im-
prove reputation. Another important feature of the oﬀshore experts is that they are not only
embedded locally. Through participating in global industry activities such as standardization or
international research projects, they are well connected on a global scale. Moreover, Huawei does
not only proﬁt from the experts’ contacts but from their ability to come up with new and innova-
tive products, which is one of their main tasks at Huawei.
Article three examined the global split of R&D activities and ﬁnds that Huawei now mainly im-
ports new ideas from their more research-oriented oﬀshore locations to their more development-
focused laboratories in China, where those ideas are turned into products. The company splits
its R&D into research abroad in centers of state-of-the-art-knowledge and development at home,
where it proﬁts from cheaper labor and proximity to production. The oﬀshore experts, who are
better at idea creation through their industry experience and creative training, bridge the lack of
innovation capability at Huawei’s domestic locations. This strategic division of labor creates out-
put capability, but it also shows that Huawei’s domestic R&D has not yet achieved innovation
capability because it relies on the inﬂow of ideas from abroad. This dependency might be risky in
particular in host countries. The quantitative analysis indicates that the transfer of ideas toChina
is signiﬁcantlymore successful and faster than vice versa. The analysis also shows that sending and
absorptive capacity as well as the intricacy of ideas play an important role for the success and speed
of the transfer. Over time fewer ideas are transferred to China at constant speed, while the trans-
fer of ideas fromChina increases in speed over time. This might be an indicator that the R&D in
China is catching up on innovation capability.
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5.2 Main ﬁndings
The following section integrates the ﬁndings from all three articles to point out the main ﬁnd-
ings. Even if it is risky,Huawei does itsmost inﬂuentialR&Dabroad because thisway it can bridge
the lack of innovation capability at home. Moreover, hiring experts abroad increases legitimacy
for operating in the global industry, which is particularly important in sensitive industries such
as telecommunications. This is achieved by the global embeddedness of the hires, which refers to
their contacts and reputation in the global telecommunications industry. When studying high-
proﬁle hiring byMNEs abroad, we often assume that companies are looking for local or regional
contacts from their new employees, but for Huawei we ﬁnd that those contacts are global and
interchangeable between the hotspots of the global telecommunications industry. Moreover, this
points out how important the industry-speciﬁc global connectivity of places is for latecomers to
enter mature industries.
The articles also show that Huawei’s oﬀshore R&D is less focused on external innovation input
than expected. For instance, it becomes apparent from the interviews that many of the university
collaborations seen in the patent data aremainly aiming at boostingHuawei’s reputation and pro-
viding access to highly educated employees. The company internalizes innovation by strategically
hiring the people that have the knowledge and skills required. Instead of making use of their new
employees’ external networks, Huawei is more concerned with integrating them as creators for
new ideas internally.
Another point is that Huawei’s R&D internationalization today is not so much about absorb-
ing knowledge as we would expect, but rather about bridging lack of innovativeness. Huawei
has caught up on state-of-the-art technology, but not on innovation capability. This shows how
scarcely available and immobile innovative skills are. If the right background knowledge and there-
fore absorptive capacity is available, latecomers can learn how to produce a new technology rela-
tively quickly, while acquiring creativity and experience to create the idea for this technology are
much more diﬃcult. Therefore, innovation capability in the home market is the bottleneck late-
comer companies need to overcome on their last mile to independent global competitiveness. As
we can see for Huawei, dependency from abroad can still persist for companies that have become
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a market and technology leader. This dependency makes the company vulnerable in their host
countries and is not favorable in the long run.
5.3 Policy implications
For policy makers in leading places of innovation, the implications from these ﬁndings are three-
fold. First, latecomer companies entering established industry locations can be a means to absorb
highly qualiﬁed employees during a downturn of industry cycles. Established companies often
need a way to relieve ﬁnancial pressure during this time and tend to cut down on R&D activities.
Latecomer companies might not be subject to these cyclical industry developments yet, as they
are not as interconnected in the industry and might seize the opportunity to hire highly qualiﬁed
personnel. This way the competence and experience in the region that has often grown over years
of industry activity can stay in the region and employees stay employed in the high-value creating
jobs of the industry they are trained for. Second, higher education and research facilities also de-
pend on industries for ﬁnancing, cooperation and employment of their graduates. If a big part
of or the whole industry in a region closes, after some time universities often need to refocus as
well. Latecomer companies can help to balance out this eﬀect and bridge or even substitute for
the lack of R&D activities of established players. This became particularly clear in the example of
Huawei stepping intoNortel’s shoes in Ottawa, where a big share of employees came either from
former Nortel or the University nearby. Third, the role of the industry-speciﬁc global connectiv-
ity of places is crucial. For latecomers coming from less connected places, international contacts
are only accessible at oﬀshore locations that are already embedded in the global industry. Em-
ployees having global contacts are highly valuable for latecomers, also over locally well connected
employees. Therefore, policy makers seeking to attract latecomer OFDI should support initia-
tives seeking to better connect local industries globally through hosting global industry meetings
or increasing international cooperation of local ﬁrms.
For policy makers from emerging regions, the ﬁndings imply that investments in R&D interna-
tionalization of latecomers can help to obtain knowledge and therefore absorptive capability, but
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achieving innovation capability is an even longer and more diﬃcult process. Even if some late-
comers might achieve industry leadership, policy makers should look closely at what is attached
to the inﬂow of innovative output from abroad. There could be a hidden dependency on oﬀshore
innovation that might turn out to be unfavorable for the latecomer. Therefore, building up in-
novation capabilities at home should be a goal for emerging regions and their latecomers alike.
In terms of measures taken, putting emphasis on creative capabilities in education may be a step
in the right direction, but will take a long time to become eﬀective and can not compensate the
inherent lack of experience young local industries usually have.
For managers of latecomer companies, the results show that greenﬁeld investments might be an
alternative to acquisitions even in knowledge-seeking motivated R&D internationalization. This
approach can also be a means for knowledge absorption and might be an easier, light-touch ap-
proach given high liabilities from abroad. The ﬁndings point out how important strategic hiring
is and show that the most important characteristics for R&D employees engaged in idea creating
tasks are experience and embeddedness in the global industry community, not necessarily at the
hiring location itself. Therefore, for entering an established and globalized industry, the choice
of R&D location should focus more on gateway locations of the global industry than on local
connectivity.
5.4 Limitations, contributions and future research
When critically reviewing the approach taken here, it is important to bear in mind that the ﬁnd-
ings from this case study are not applicable to all latecomers and industries. Using a single case cre-
ates limitations to generalizability and requires analytic instead of statistical generalization (Yin,
2014; Brinkmann & Kvale, 2018). Therefore, the ﬁndings need to be carefully viewed in the light
of the case-speciﬁc features. Some of the ﬁndings concerning Huawei’s way to the top, such as
its extensive hiring from competitors, are more easily applicable to latecomers from China that
share particular features such as strong government support for internationalization, easy access
to cheap credit and often received skepticism inWesternmarkets. Nevertheless, we need to diﬀer-
109
Chapter 5
entiate between ﬁndings more speciﬁc to the company and mechanisms more widely applicable.
For example, the ﬁndings on the role the oﬀshore experts can play in catch-up and the transfer of
ideas more easily apply to a wider group of latecomers.
Another point is that even if the mixed-methods approach particularly aims at uncovering the
blind spots of patent data research, the embedded design of the interview sampling, which means
identifying interviewees from the patent data, limits the conceptualization of innovation. One of
the disadvantages is that it still only observes the kind of innovation processes that yield patentable
output and neglects other forms of innovation and idea creation. Therefore, it might underesti-
mate the innovativeness of Huawei’s Chinese R&D in areas that are not using patenting as much
and which are not as visible from the perspective of the oﬀshore employees. Another blind spot
of this research design is missing insights from Huawei’s higher management. Even if relying
too much on these sources for information was explicitly avoided (Tokatli, 2015), the current ap-
proach omits ﬁrst-hand insights into the reasoning behind the decision making in the company.
Keeping inmind these limitations, theﬁndings contribute to research in severalways. Onamethod-
ological level, this dissertation shows how combining patent data with qualitative interviews in a
mixed-methods approach can ﬁll in the blind spots we usually have when looking at data in gen-
eral and patent data in particular. This sheds light onto the underlying processes that generate
global patterns. For instance the innovation capability of senior oﬀshore experts, who are pre-
ferred for hiring for their long standing industry experience, helps to explain the higher patent
quality abroad and the ﬂow of ideas from oﬀshore to domestic locations. Understanding the
micro-mechanisms of idea creation helps us make sense of the broader patterns we see in the data.
Chapter 4 shows this in particular by integrating both types of data tightly. Moreover, by inves-
tigating the micro-level, the articles uncovered spatial dependencies and their antecedents that
would not necessarily be visible by studying the company level alone. A better understanding of
the role of the oﬀshore employees and their relative spatial immobility helps to understand why
the host locations are attractive for foreign investment directed towards knowledge-intensive ac-
tivities. Identifying the key characteristics that draw foreignMNEs to a certain location has also
implications for the local impact of the investment. For instance, the insight that Huawei mainly
needed the global connectivity of its hires could help policy makers decide how to support this
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feature. Understanding the role of the oﬀshore experts in creating innovative products helps us
to learn more about the key characteristics of the host locations that attract knowledge-intensive
foreign investment.
Coming back to the initial motivation and research questions, I ﬁnd that even if Huawei’s ap-
proach to create output capability before achieving innovation capability leaves the company vul-
nerable topolitical risks in thehost countries, this strategy couldbe amiddle step for otherEMNEs
and their regions of origin on their way to build innovation capability. Using greenﬁeld invest-
ments in industry R&D hubs abroad and integrating them tightly into the internal creation of
new technologies gives the company control over the whole process. This is diﬀerent from the
more common picture of established MNEs exercising control over global value creation by oﬀ-
shoring and potentially outsourcing highly standardized tasks that add less value to regions with
lower labor costs. This usually leaves actors in those regions with little bargaining power over the
upgrading of their tasks in the long term. Instead, the Chinese company proﬁts from the same lo-
cation advantages as established players while being in control of the spatial distribution of value
creation and the orchestration of technology ﬂow towards its home country. This might be a
way to upgrade the knowledge-intensity and added-value of tasks performed in its home region in
China in the long run, creating positive eﬀects on economic wealth and welfare.
Based on the previously discussed ﬁndings and contributions, I would like to give four recommen-
dations for future research. The ﬁrst is to continue the eﬀort of combining perspectives from
EG and IB. This is important as companies form the meso-level of economic activity and are ma-
jor players in orchestrating and shaping the landscape of those global economic activities. This
study shows that taking into account diﬀerent levels of analysis can create a more comprehensive
picture of global patterns and its underlying mechanisms. By studying the role of experts from
oﬀshore locations and the pattern of Huawei’s global innovative activities, I was able to generate
a much more nuanced picture of the mechanisms that helped the company rise to technological
leadership.
The second recommendation is to focus our attention on less studied entry modes for R&D in-
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ternationalization. As we know that the approach of acquiring ﬁrms abroad does not always suc-
cessfully lead to higher innovative output (Amendolagine et al., 2018), Huawei’s catching-up by
hiring strategy based on greenﬁeld investment might be an alternative for latecomer companies.
But in order to identify the right audience to which we should recommend this approach, more
research is needed to contrast the mechanisms of the two entry modes directly. This is particu-
larly neededwith regards tomechanisms of knowledge integration and participation in innovative
activity within and outside the ﬁrm. Such an approach could help us better understand the pro
and cons of each strategy and help to identify situations or industries in which latecomers might
choose one over the other.
The third recommendation I would like tomake is to conceptualize more carefully what the liter-
ature usually studies under the term knowledge transfer. This dissertation has shown that in some
cases, ideasmight be themore precise way to describe the information that is transferred, while in
others the term knowledge or technologymight be more accurate (Andersson et al., 2016), depend-
ing on the purpose of the transfer. In particular chapter four shows that over time, diﬀerent kinds
of information such as ideas, technological or organizational knowledgemight be required by the
spatially disperse units of an MNE and therefore the object of transfer. Future research should
look more into these changing needs, in particular in the context of EMNEs’ catch-up process.
Moreover, the development of channels and potential barriers for the transfer of these distinct
kinds of information might diﬀer and should be studied in greater depth.
My fourth recommendation is that further research should look into the role of industry stan-
dardization processes as a barrier to market entry for latecomer companies. This ﬁeld has been
studied from the perspective of countries and industries implementing technical standards, but
only very little is known about the inﬂuence of exclusion fromparticipating in standardization on
ﬁrms, in particular latecomers and their access to global markets. Therefore, research should look
deeper into the processes and negotiations in industry standard-setting in order to identify hur-
dles that exclude latecomers fromcontributing to industry standards and strategies of overcoming
them. In particular the possible discrimination against companies from economically peripheral
or emerging regions should be a central question in the investigations.
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Interview guide
Experts
Where did you work / study before?
How did you come to work for Huawei? /Why did Huawei hire you?
What is your main task at Huawei?
Are your tasks at Huawei diﬀerent from your tasks at your former employer? If yes: how?
Locations
How old / big was the oﬀshore laboratory when you joined?
Does each of the worldwide R&D locations focus on a particular technology?
If yes: How do the locations choose their focus?
Is there a diﬀerence in technology / tasks between oﬀshore locations / oﬀshore and domestic lo-
cations?
Cooperation inside
Do you (regularly) work with colleagues from diﬀerent locations at Huawei?
If yes: How closely do you work with Chinese expatriates at your location / oﬀshore experts at
other oﬀshore locations / Chinese employees at locations in China?
How much knowledge exchange takes place between diﬀerent R&D locations within the com-
pany?
Do you share newly created technologies within the company? If yes: How?
Do people from other R&D locations contact you with questions / collaboration requests?
Howmuch knowledge exchange does usually take place between diﬀerent locations?
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How closely do you work with Chinese expatriates at your location / oﬀshore experts at other
oﬀshore locations / Chinese employees at locations in China?
Do you encounter cultural barriers / language barriers at work?
Cooperation outside
Did you already live at your current job location when you were hired by Huawei?
Did you already have (local) professional contacts when you were hired by Huawei? If yes: How
many?
Did you use previously established contacts in academia / the industry for your job at Huawei? If
yes: what did you use them for?
DidHuawei proﬁt from you contacts after you were hired? If yes: fromwhich and in which way?
Do you (regularly) workwith colleague fromoutside the company? If yes: How close do youwork
withpeople fromoutside the company? HowdoesHuawei ﬁndpartners for external cooperation?
Do you / Did you suggest the external partners you were working with?
Do you experience reservation / resentments from other companies / researchers againstHuawei?
Are there any barriers for Huawei operating R&D abroad?
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